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THE WRONG TOOL FOR THE JOB: THE IP PROBLEM WITH
NONCOMPETITION AGREEMENTS

VIVA R. MOFFAT*
ABSTRACT
This Article argues that employee noncompetition agreements
ought to be unenforceable. It begins by recognizing that there is
momentum for change in the law of noncompetes: a number of states
and the American Law Institute (ALI) are in the process of reconsidering noncompete doctrine, and recent empirical studies provide
evidence as to the mostly negative effects of the agreements. Existing
critiques have focused on the problematic nature of noncompetes
within the employment relationship. This Article synthesizes those
critiques, adding support from empirical studies, and then examines
noncompetes from a new perspective.
Commentators have neither recognized nor evaluated the role
noncompetes play in the intellectual property (IP) system. Upon
closer examination, it becomes clear that the primary justification
put forth in support of noncompetes is an IP justification: the
arguments in favor of enforcement of the agreements revolve around
the need to protect intangibles and the need to provide incentives for
invention and investment. The IP justification is pervasive and
rhetorically powerful but ultimately flawed. First, trade secret and
other IP protections are intentionally limited to provide a certain
amount of, but not too much, protection. Allowing enforcement of
noncompetes in order to protect IP thus interferes with the contours
of IP protection. Second, even to the extent that IP law is insuffi* Assistant Professor, University of Denver Sturm College of Law. Thanks to
participants at the 2009 Intellectual Property Scholars’ Conference and the Rocky Mountain
Junior Scholars’ Forum for excellent feedback on earlier versions of this Article. Thanks also
to Rachel Arnow-Richman, Alan Chen, Sam Kamin, Paul Ohm, Wendy Seltzer, Harry
Surden, and Ryan Vacca for commenting on drafts. Heidi Haberman and Diana Mead
provided outstanding research assistance. Finally, I am grateful for support from the Chu
Family Faculty Fellowship.
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cient—that is, unintentionally limited—noncompetes are not the
right tool for the IP job. A prohibition on the enforcement of noncompetes would thus serve a channeling function, directing efforts to
protect intangibles to the IP regimes and encouraging the development of the appropriate IP balance, which is, of course, a work in
progress.
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INTRODUCTION
As intangible assets have become more valuable and increasingly
difficult to control, business owners have turned to a variety of
mechanisms to protect these assets. They have adopted a “belt-andsuspenders” approach. In addition to taking advantage of IP, contract, and tort law tools, firms have increasingly been asking employees to sign noncompetes1—contracts in which employees agree
not to compete with the employer after the termination of the employment relationship.2 As the use of noncompetes has become more
widespread, controversy over these agreements has also increased.
In the last few years, at least six states have reconsidered the
doctrine concerning enforceability of such agreements.3 Currently,

1. These may be stand-alone agreements or provisions in employment contracts, and
they are variously referred to as non-competes, noncompetes, noncompetition agreements, and
covenants not to compete. I use the term noncompete here, but the meanings are interchangeable.
2. See Rachel Arnow-Richman, Cubewrap Contracts and Worker Mobility: The Dilution
of Employee Bargaining Power via Standard Form Noncompetes, 2006 MICH. ST. L. REV. 963,
981 n.59 [hereinafter Arnow-Richman, Dilution of Employee Bargaining Power] (“While there
is a dearth of statistical research on this issue, commentators generally agree based on
anecdotal evidence and informal studies that employers’ use of noncompetes and pursuit of
claims for breach of such agreements are on the rise.”); see also Christine M. O’Malley, Note,
Covenants Not To Compete in the Massachusetts Hi-Tech Industry: Assessing the Need for a
Legislative Solution, 79 B.U. L. REV. 1215, 1216 (1999) (“[H]i-tech companies have increasingly
relied on broad non-compete clauses in employment agreements.” (citing Hanna Bui-Eve,
Note, To Hire or Not To Hire: What Silicon Valley Companies Should Know About Hiring
Competitor’s Employees, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 981, 985 (1997))).
3. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 44-2701 (2008) (validating noncompetes between an
employer and a “key employee” or a “key independent contractor”); N.Y. LAB. LAW § 202-K
(Consol. 2003 & Supp. 2010) (restricting enforcement of noncompetes in broadcasting
contracts); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 653.295 (West 2009) (presuming that noncompetes are void,
but enforcing agreements under some circumstances); H.B. 4607, 186th Gen. Court (Mass.
2010), available at http://www.malegislature.gov/Bills/BillText/8489 (providing for the
continued enforceability of noncompetes, subject to equitable exceptions, and including
provisions for employees and employers to receive attorneys’ fees for successfully defending
noncompetes, choice of law provisions, and the continued protection of trade secrets by other
lawful means); H.B. 173, 150th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2009), available at http://
www.legis.state.ga.us/legis/2009_10/pdf/hb173.pdf (expanding enforceability of noncompetes);
H.B. 4040, 96th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2009), available at http://www.ilga.gov/
legislation/96/HB/PDF/09600HB4040lv.pdf (restricting, but not eliminating, noncompete
enforcement).
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noncompetes are enforceable in a majority of states,4 but a few
states simply refuse to enforce the agreements. The California
Supreme Court roundly condemned noncompetes on public policy
grounds in a recent opinion reaffirming that state’s blanket rule
against enforceability.5 The ALI is in the process of drafting a
Restatement of Employment Law that includes a provision permitting enforcement of noncompetes.6 The stark differences in state law
have made it possible for scholars to undertake empirical projects
concerning noncompetes,7 and these studies do not provide support
for continued use of the agreements.8 The results of these recent
studies on noncompetes and the momentum for reform indicate that
the time is ripe for a thorough reexamination of the use of and
justifications for noncompetes.
Employment law scholars have paid a great deal of attention to
two aspects of noncompetes: they have critiqued the agreements as
the product of a flawed bargaining process and as being fundamentally unfair to employees.9 Few scholars, however, have paid
attention to another aspect of noncompetes—the fact that they are
widely used to protect IP and IP-like assets.10 Taking a fresh look at
noncompetes requires both a reevaluation of the agreements as a
4. See Mark J. Garmaise, Ties that Truly Bind: Noncompetition Agreements, Executive
Compensation, and Firm Investment, J.L. ECON. & ORG., Nov. 3, 2009, at 13-14, 44,
http://jleo.oxfordjournals.org/content/early/2009/11/03/jleo.ewp033.full.pdf+html.
5. Edwards v. Arthur Anderson L.L.P., 189 P.3d 285, 291 (Cal. 2008); see CAL. BUS. &
PROF. CODE § 16600 (West 2008). A few other states take the same position, rendering
employee noncompetition agreements unenforceable, with just a few narrow exceptions. See,
e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-08-06 (2010) (containing language identical to California’s statute).
The North Dakota statute reflects North Dakota’s “long-standing public policy against
restraints upon free trade.” Warner & Co. v. Solberg, 634 N.W.2d 65, 69-70 (N.D. 2001). In
California, the exceptions to enforceability are noncompetes in the context of a sale of a
business, a partnership arrangement, and an action to protect goodwill. CAL. BUS. & PROF.
CODE §§ 16601-16602 (West 2008).
6. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 8.06 (Preliminary Draft No. 7, 2010)
(“[A] covenant in an agreement between the employer and the former employee restricting a
former employee’s activities is enforceable if it is reasonably tailored in scope, geography, and
time to further a protectable interest of the employer.”).
7. See infra notes 167-72 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 79-84, 167-72 and accompanying text. This conclusion could be stated
in a stronger form—that studies provide support for a rule against enforcement of
noncompetes—but that may be taking the evidence a bit too far and is not necessary for the
argument here.
9. See infra notes 41-45 and accompanying text.
10. See infra note 88.
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part of the employment relationship and an understanding of the
agreements in the context of IP regulation.
The existing critiques are powerful. Employment law scholars
have explored some of the problematic aspects of noncompetes,
focusing their attacks on the freedom of contract rationale for
enforcement of the agreements.11 In particular, they have emphasized that noncompetes result from a deeply flawed bargaining
process and impose significant restrictions on employee mobility.12
These critiques, which recent empirical studies of the effects of
noncompetes on individuals and the broader labor market support,
have led to suggestions for a variety of doctrinal fixes.13
What has gone virtually unnoticed, however, is the primary
argument put forth in favor of noncompetes—the IP justification. It
proceeds as follows: noncompetes are necessary to protect trade
secrets or other IP assets, or they are necessary to provide an
incentive for firms to invent and invest.14 The main thrust of the
justification is that other forms of protection, primarily trade secret
law, are too weak and that noncompetes are necessary to supplement IP rights, or as an alternative to these rights.15
The IP justification, whether explicit or implicit, fails in the
context of employee noncompetes. To some extent at least, trade
secret law and other forms of protection for intangibles are intentionally limited, performing a channeling function by directing some
inventions to the patent regime and others to the public domain.16
Even to the extent that trade secret law is unintentionally weak, the
IP justification for noncompetes is not compelling because
noncompetes are not a good tool for achieving the purposes of IP
protection.17 In either event, a refusal to enforce noncompetes would
serve a channeling function, directing efforts to protect intangibles

11. See infra Part I.B.
12. See infra Part I.B.
13. See infra notes 73-84 and accompanying text.
14. See infra Part II.A.1.
15. See infra Part II.A.1.
16. This is not to say that trade secret law is perfectly calibrated, but only that it, like
other areas of IP protection, entails some effort to balance the rights of owners with other
interests, as well as with other forms of IP protection. See infra Part II.
17. See infra Part II.B.
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to the IP regimes, rather than allowing an end run around these
regimes with a tool that is so problematic in other ways.
Neither employment law scholars nor IP scholars have explored
or challenged the understanding of noncompetes as an IP tool.
Taking into account both the long-standing view of noncompetes as
the product of a flawed bargaining process and the new understanding of noncompetes as misguided efforts to protect IP, there remain
no persuasive arguments in favor of enforcing the agreements.
This Article proceeds as follows: In Part I, I describe the freedom
of contract rationale in the context of employee noncompetes and
summarize the critiques, primarily from employment law scholars,
that undermine that justification. These critiques focus on the flaws
in the bargaining process and the restrictions on employee mobility.
In addition, recent empirical studies support the theoretical arguments against noncompetes, demonstrating the weakness of the
freedom of contract rationale. In Part II, I turn to the largely unexamined IP justification for noncompetes and argue it is much less
compelling than the rhetoric would imply. Noncompetes should be
understood as used primarily to protect intangible assets, but they
are simply the wrong tool for the job. Finally, I conclude that the
arguments in favor of noncompetes are so weak that use of the
agreements cannot be justified. Although the long-standing critiques of noncompetes undermine the arguments in favor of
enforcement, it is the failure of the IP justification that leads to the
conclusion that the agreements should simply be unenforceable.
State legislatures, rather than courts, however, must implement
this reform.
I. THE CLASSIC PROBLEMS WITH NONCOMPETES
Firms are increasingly using noncompetes to restrict the postemployment activities of current employees, limiting the type,
location, and extent of subsequent employment.18 They may be
stand-alone agreements or part of a broader employment agreement, and they may be entered into at the outset of the employment
relationship, in the midst of it, or at the termination of employment.
18. See supra note 2.
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In many jurisdictions, the agreements will be enforced if they are
deemed necessary to protect an employer’s “legitimate interests”
and are “reasonable” in terms of the restrictions imposed upon the
employee.19 Notably, however, noncompetes are simply unenforceable in a few states, regardless of the employer’s “interests” and the
reasonableness of the provisions.20 These differences in state law are
the result of the conflicting public policy concerns raised by the use
of these agreements: the free flow of labor and freedom of contract.
The increased use of noncompetes, along with the conflicting
policy concerns they implicate, has led to controversy over their use
and effects. State courts have been tinkering with the doctrine, a
number of legislatures have considered or passed noncompete
statutes, and the ALI is drafting noncompete provisions as part of
its Restatement (Third) of Employment Law.21
Thus the time is ripe for a reevaluation of the use and enforceability of noncompetition agreements. A fresh look at noncompetes
requires a reevaluation of the existing scholarly approaches. These
have primarily come from employment law scholars focused,
understandably, on the operation of noncompetes as part of the
employment relationship. In this Part, I briefly describe the freedom
19. In most states, courts apply some variation on the common law “rule of reason,”
examining the effects on the employee, the needs or interests of the employer, and the public
interest to evaluate whether a given restriction is reasonable. See, e.g., Roanoke Eng’g Sales
Co. v. Rosenbaum, 290 S.E.2d 882, 884 (Va. 1982) (applying a three-part balancing test,
assessing whether the restraint is reasonable (1) “from the standpoint of the employer ... in
the sense that it is no greater than is necessary to protect the employer in some legitimate
business interest”; (2) “[f]rom the standpoint of the employee ... in the sense that it is not
unduly harsh and oppressive in curtailing his legitimate efforts to earn a livelihood”; and
(3) “from the standpoint of a sound public policy”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§ 188 (1981) (stating that a court must consider (1) whether “the restraint is greater than is
needed to protect the [employer’s] legitimate interest,” (2) the hardship to the employee, and
(3) “the likely injury to the public”).
20. Although California and a few other states currently have strong rules prohibiting
enforcement of noncompetes, see supra note 5 and accompanying text, the agreements are
generally enforceable in most states. No jurisdiction takes a pure private ordering approach,
however. See Cynthia L. Estlund, Between Rights and Contract: Arbitration Agreements and
Non-Compete Covenants as a Hybrid Form of Employment Law, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 379, 395
(2006) [hereinafter Estlund, Between Rights] (“Across the country, however, postemployment
covenants not to compete are subject not merely to the ordinary requirements of contract law
but to additional substantive conditions that external law imposes on these agreements in
particular.”).
21. See supra notes 3-6 and accompanying text.
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of contract rationale and the extent to which critiques from
employment law scholars and the results of recent empirical work
erode that justification in the context of employee noncompetes.
A. The Standard Justification for Noncompetes
As with all contracts, a fundamental justification for noncompetes
is the freedom of contract principle.22 The principle is generally
animated by a free market ethos: independent actors should be free
to enter into any agreements they choose.23 Underlying this ethos is
the assumption that market-based transactions will be more efficient.24 Thus the default rule is that agreements will be enforced
and that courts will not interfere with the substance of those agreements, with exceptions for circumstances in which the voluntariness
of the agreement is particularly suspect, for example, in cases of
misrepresentation, duress, or unconscionability.25 This approach is
consistent with the neoclassical model of promoting bargained-for
agreements but rejecting those agreements that are the product of
a significantly flawed bargaining process.26
Courts will rarely invoke these doctrines to hold individual contracts unenforceable, much less classes of contracts.27 Standard-form
22. See, e.g., Edmund W. Kitch, The Law and Economics of Rights in Valuable
Information, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 683, 686 (1980) (“The central issue is not the desirability of
such contractual arrangements in particular cases but why employer and employee are not
free to enter into arrangements that they consider desirable in light of the circumstances.
Why doesn’t the usual assumption that contracting parties can protect their own interests
control here as elsewhere?”).
23. Id.
24. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK, THE LIMITS OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 15-16 (1997)
(stating that “neo-classical economists have a predilection for resource allocation through
voluntary exchanges as opposed to collective decisions because they believe that one can have
a higher degree of confidence in the welfare implications of private exchanges”).
25. U.C.C. § 2-302 (2009) (unconscionability); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 164
(1981) (misrepresentation); id. § 175 (duress).
26. See Richard A. Epstein, Unconscionability: A Critical Reappraisal, 18 J.L. & ECON.
293, 293 (1975) (“The classical conception of contract at common law had as its first premise
the belief that private agreements should be enforced in accordance with their terms. That
premise of course was subject to important qualifications. Promises procured by fraud, duress,
or undue influence were not generally enforced by the courts.”).
27. See Charles A. Sullivan, The Puzzling Persistence of Unenforceable Contract Terms,
70 OHIO ST. L.J. 1127, 1170 (2009) (“[O]nce an agreement passes these various, large-grained
screens, the courts generally seem to feel compelled to enforce it.”).
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consumer contracts, for example, have been roundly criticized on a
variety of fronts, yet their continued use is certainly not in
jeopardy.28 As is true of noncompetes,29 standard-form consumer
contracts depart fairly radically from the neoclassical model of
contracting: they are the product of vastly unequal bargaining
power, the terms generally favor the drafter,30 in many circumstances there is slim possibility of opting out, and they are, as a
practical matter, never negotiated. But in the consumer contract
context, the arguments in favor of enforceability—efficiency and
practicality, primarily—retain a great deal of force.31 It is nearly
impossible to imagine a world in which there are no consumer
contracts, or in which every contract accompanying a camera or a
computer or even a new pair of jeans bought online must be
individually negotiated and discussed.32 As a general matter, the
freedom of contract rationale provides a strong argument for robust
28. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, Consenting to Form Contracts, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 627,
627 (2002) (“In practice, form contracts are ubiquitous.”); Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of
Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1173, 1235-38 (1983) (setting forth
the now-classic critique of contracts of adhesion, but also concluding that “[i]f business firms
play an important part in maintaining such a society, and if their ability to do so depends
significantly on the use of standard forms, perhaps enforcement of the forms can be justified”).
Along with many others, I have argued that adhesion contracts ought to be policed more
strictly. See Viva R. Moffat, Super-Copyright: Contracts, Preemption, and the Structure of
Copyright Policymaking, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 45, 45 (2007) (arguing that adhesion contract
terms limiting fair use ought to be preempted).
29. See infra Part I.B.1.
30. But see Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, Are “Pay Now, Terms Later” Contracts Worse for
Buyers? Evidence from Software License Agreements, 38 J. LEGAL STUD. 309, 312 (2009) (“At
least with respect to software license terms, buyers do not, on average, receive more pro-seller
contracts when the terms are disclosed only after purchase. Scholars and consumer advocates,
then, should not be particularly concerned about rolling contracts. It is important to note,
however, that the tests in this paper cannot answer the broader question of whether all [enduser license agreements], or standard-form contracts in general, contain poor-quality terms
according to some absolute standard.”).
31. Sullivan, supra note 27, at 1148.
32. It is difficult to know what percentage of consumer contracts are standard-form
agreements, but scholars agree that they are very widely used. See Arnow-Richman, Dilution
of Employee Bargaining Power, supra note 2, at 977 n.51 (“While there is little empirical
evidence about the number of standard form contracts relative to the number of contracts
generally, scholars agree that standardized forms are ubiquitous and represent the dominant
mode of private ordering in the contemporary economy.” (citing Russell Korobkin, Bounded
Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203, 1203
(2003); W. David Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and Democratic Control of Lawmaking
Power, 84 HARV. L. REV. 529, 529 (1971))).
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and hands-off contract enforcement in all but the most egregious
cases.33
In the noncompete context, the more specific version of the freedom of contract argument is that “human capital” ought to be fully
alienable, primarily for efficiency reasons.34 Professor Stewart Sterk
argues, for example, that
[i]n justifying these restraints [on alienability], ... courts and
scholars have rarely considered an important distributional
effect of these restraints on alienation: the persons most likely
to benefit from rules that keep future earning capacity in the
hands of its original holder are those persons best endowed with
the talents, skills, and knowledge that contribute to that earning
capacity.35

This is, essentially, an efficiency-based argument, and Sterk
describes a refusal to enforce noncompetes as paternalistic: “courts
or legislatures substitute social judgments about the appropriate
trade-offs between compensation and future freedom for the
decisions parties make by contract.”36 Noncompetes are thus justified on the same freedom of contract rationale that animates
contract law generally.

33. Stewart E. Sterk, Restraints on Alienation of Human Capital, 79 VA. L. REV. 383, 412
(1993) (“[I]f the owner of more traditional forms of property sells or restricts his future use
of that property—as might be the case with the grant of an easement, for instance—courts are
unlikely to invalidate the transfer years later unless presented with evidence of fraud or
overreaching in the original bargain.”).
34. Maureen B. Callahan, Comment, Post-Employment Restraint Agreements: A
Reassessment, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 703, 705 (1985) (“The willingness of courts to make
independent judgments about the reasonableness of post-employment restraints imposes
significant costs that would be avoided by the general rule of nonintervention.”). Note that the
alleged need to protect or invest in “human capital” is another version of the IP justification.
Human capital is perhaps the epitome of an intangible, and the various IP regimes and rules
governing the workplace deal with who, if anyone, owns various aspects of human capital.
35. Sterk, supra note 33, at 385. This Article takes a position nearly diametrically opposed
to Sterk’s. Sterk contends that the arguments for limiting noncompete enforcement are
particularly weak. “The principal justifications for refusing to enforce ‘unreasonable’
covenants not to compete, however, are insufficient.” Id. at 387. Sterk “concludes that the
existing doctrinal structure, which requires fact-specific judicial evaluation of covenants for
reasonableness, rests on foundations that are problematic at best.” Id.
36. Id. at 411-12.
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B. Undermining the Freedom of Contract Rationale
The neoclassical model from which the freedom of contract ideal
springs assumes that contracts are the result of a relatively equal,
arms-length negotiation process. Notwithstanding the theoretical
argument concerning the efficiency of noncompetes, they depart
radically from the neoclassical model. Employment law scholars,
primarily, have demonstrated the weakness of the rationale in the
noncompete context.
In examining the use and operation of noncompetes, these
scholars have, understandably, focused on noncompetes as an aspect
of the employment relationship or in the context of the broader labor
market. In doing so, they have identified two problematic aspects of
the use of noncompetes: first, the agreements result from a deeply
flawed bargaining process; second, they restrict employee mobility.37
Recent empirical work bolsters these critiques.
The bargaining process concerns are multifaceted but exemplified
by the fact that the agreements are rarely negotiated and, indeed,
are often entered into well after the employment relationship has
begun. An agreement may state, for example, in its preamble: “In
consideration of my employment or continued employment, ...
[employee] agree[s] with the Company as follows....”38 And noncompetes are, of course, designed to restrict employee mobility, regularly limiting the types of future employment that employees may
accept for a year or more. The same sample agreement provides that
the employee
will not, during the period of [her] employment by the Company
and in the event that [her] employment with the Company is
terminated for any reason whatsoever and whether such
termination be voluntary or involuntary, for a period of three
years (3) following such termination, (i) directly or indirectly
engage in any competitive business.39
37. Arnow-Richman, Dilution of Employee Bargaining Power, supra note 2, at 966.
38. Sample Noncompete from GT Solar Inc., http://contracts.onecle.com/gt-solar/woodburynon-competition-2008-01-07.shtml (last visited Nov. 12, 2010) [hereinafter Sample
Agreement] (emphasis added).
39. Id. (emphasis added). Some other significant aspects of this exemplary agreement will
be addressed in Part II. For now, it is sufficient to keep in mind that (1) the agreement makes
explicit that its purpose is to protect the employer’s IP; (2) the employer’s “Proprietary
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Parts I.B.1-2 elaborate on these two concerns and incorporate the
results of several recent empirical studies that confirm some of the
theoretical critiques.
1. Noncompetes Are the Product of an Inherently Flawed
Bargaining Process
Given the obvious negative consequences for an employee of
entering into a noncompete—the inability to work for certain
employers, in certain places, for some extended period of time—the
logical question is why do employees do so? The answer likely lies
in the circumstances surrounding the bargaining process.
Commentators have discussed the systematically unequal bargaining power between employees and employers in general, and
the extent to which that plays out in the drafting, negotiation, and
enforcement of noncompetes.40 In arguing for the reform of noncompete doctrine, many scholars have focused on these arguments. I
synthesize these arguments in this Section, along with the results
of recent empirical work, and conclude that these arguments remain
powerful critiques of noncompetes.
Employee-employer relations are characterized by unequal
bargaining power: as a general matter, employers have vastly more
power in the negotiation and performance of the employment
relationship.41 This asymmetry heavily influences the existence and
character of employee noncompetes. They are uniformly drafted by

Information” is defined very broadly to include everything from systems and formulae to price
and customer lists; and, finally, (3) the agreement references the “highly competitive nature
of the business of the Company” and states that the purpose of the agreement is to “prevent
any competitive business from gaining any unfair advantage from [the employee’s] knowledge
of Proprietary Information.” Id.
40. See infra notes 41-45 and accompanying text.
41. Employment law scholars have explored this subject in depth. See, e.g., ArnowRichman, Dilution of Employee Bargaining Power, supra note 2, at 963 (“Employment
relationships are perhaps the paradigmatic example of inequality of bargaining power in
contract law.”); Mayer G. Freed & Daniel D. Polsby, Just Cause for Termination Rules and
Economic Efficiency, 38 EMORY L.J. 1097, 1099 (1989) (“The most commonly encountered
market failure idea is the inequality of bargaining power that supposedly subsists between
the employer and employee. This notion of inequality of bargaining power pervades
discussions about regulation of the employment relationship.”). See generally Daniel D.
Barnhizer, Inequality of Bargaining Power, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 139 (2005) (discussing the
concept of inequality of bargaining power in contract law).
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the employer and only rarely negotiated by the employee. As such,
they nearly always favor the employer.42 The comments to the
Restatement of Contracts provision on noncompetes put it succinctly: “Post-employment restraints are scrutinized with particular
care because they are often the product of unequal bargaining power
and because the employee is likely to give scant attention to the
hardship he may later suffer through loss of his livelihood.”43
Commentators have noted the increased use of boilerplate employment agreements44 and the one-sided nature of those agreements.
42. See Estlund, Between Rights, supra note 20, at 384 (“Most employment contracts arise
between individuals who are more or less dependent on a single job and comparatively large
organizations that are repeat players with diversified investments in the labor market. Most
contract terms are offered by employers on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, and are set under the
shadow of employment at will—the employer’s presumptive power to fire employees for any
reason at all, including refusal to accept the employer’s proferred or modified terms of
employment.”); see also O’Malley, supra note 2, at 1216 (“In a typical situation, the hi-tech
employer drafts a non-competition agreement and compels the prospective employee, who
lacks bargaining power and legal sophistication, to sign it as a condition of employment. As
a result, most non-competition agreements contain a strong bias in the employer’s favor.”);
Griffin Toronjo Pivateau, Putting the Blue Pencil Down: An Argument for Specificity in
Noncompete Agreements, 86 NEB. L. REV. 672, 676 (2008) (noting that “noncompete
agreements are almost invariably drafted in favor of the employer” (citing Kenneth J. Vanko,
“You’re Fired! And Don’t Forget Your Noncompete...” The Enforceability of Restrictive
Covenants in Involuntary Discharge Cases, 1 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 1, 1 (2002))). Law and
economics scholars, on the other hand, have pushed back against the notion that employees
are systematically disadvantaged in bargaining with their employers or potential employers.
See, e.g., Estlund, Between Rights, supra note 20, at 388 n.18 (“Law-and-economics scholars
have repeatedly criticized the ‘unequal bargaining power’ claim and argued for greater
deference to contracts.” (citing Stewart J. Schwab, The Law and Economics Approach to
Workplace Regulation, in GOVERNMENT REGULATION OF THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP 91,
111-13 (Bruce E. Kaufman ed., 1997); Michael L. Wachter & Randall D. Wright, The
Economics of Internal Labor Markets, 29 INDUS. REL. 240, 260 (1990))); see also Michael H.
Gottesman, Wither Goest Labor Law: Law and Economics in the Workplace, 100 YALE L.J.
2767, 2770-71 (1991) (book review) (discussing the debate between “adherents of neoclassical
economics who contend that there is no reason for the law to treat the sale of labor differently
from the sale of products” and those who, for example, argue that “collective bargaining ...
truly is the most effective ordering principle for the workplace”).
43. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 188 cmt. g (1981). The drafters of the
Restatement (Third) of Employment Law have apparently struggled with the proper approach
to take. The draft provision permits limited enforcement of noncompetes, and it does not
appear to acknowledge the bargaining process concerns. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
EMPLOYMENT LAW § 8.06 (Preliminary Draft No. 7, 2010).
44. Limited empirical work exists concerning the frequency with which employees enter
into noncompetes. There is surely variation by jurisdiction, by industry, by type of employer,
and by type of employee. Commentators seem to assume that the use of noncompetes is
increasing, but there is little data to support this assumption. See Toby E. Stuart & Olav
Sorenson, Liquidity Events and the Geographic Distribution of Entrepreneurial Activity, 48
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In many instances, the purpose “is not to memorialize a negotiated
set of terms, but to extract waivers of rights, thus realigning
statutory and default rules to better reflect employers’ interests.”45
Given the one-sided nature of the noncompetition obligation, one
might expect that employees take on noncompetition restrictions in
exchange for something of significance, such as higher salaries or
status or better benefits.46 This intuition is theoretically compelling,
but some evidence indicates that the contrary might, in fact, be true:
employees subject to noncompetes may receive less in the employment bargain. One study found “that tougher noncompetition enforcement promotes executive stability”—that is, decreased mobility
—as well as “reduced executive compensation.”47 Although these
findings undercut the standard freedom of contract view of bargaining, they are not entirely surprising upon further reflection. In
jurisdictions in which noncompetes are enforced, an employee’s
market power, and therefore ability to negotiate for better terms, is
reduced.
Perhaps because noncompetes are rarely negotiated and rarely
challenged in court, employers have a tendency to overreach,
ADMIN. SCI. Q. 175, 182 (2003) (“The prevalence of non-compete covenants in employment
contracts remains unknown, but available data suggest that they may be nearly ubiquitous
in employment contracts in high technology businesses. Kaplan and Strömberg (2000), for
example, found that venture capital firms required 90 percent of the founders of the
companies they financed to sign non-compete agreements. In a broader survey, Leonard
(2001) reported that 88 percent of companies with less than $50 million in sales require
employees to sign non-compete covenants.”). Another study, citing many of the same sources,
states that “[n]on-competes appear to be nearly universal in employment contracts.” Matt
Marx, Deborah Strumsky & Lee Fleming, Mobility, Skills, and the Michigan Non-Compete
Experiment, 55 MGMT. SCI. 875, 876 (2009).
45. Rachel Arnow-Richman, Cubewrap Contracts: The Rise of Delayed Term, Standard
Form Employment Agreements, 49 ARIZ. L. REV. 637, 639 (2007) [hereinafter Arnow-Richman,
Delayed Term].
46. See, e.g., Sterk, supra note 33, at 408 (“[D]enying the monopsonist power to enforce
restrictive covenants would simply cause the monopsonist to exercise that power in a different
way—for instance, by offering lower wages. Refusing to enforce restrictive covenants would
not reduce the monopsonist’s power.”). The same argument is made concerning standard-form
consumer contracts: “If one seller offers unattractive terms, a competing seller, wanting sales
for himself, will offer more attractive terms.” RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW
114 (4th ed. 1992). But see Sullivan, supra note 27, at 1149-50 (“Valid noncompetition clauses
tend to deter a firm’s employees ... from working for a competitor or, indeed, from leaving its
employ at all.... Not only does this tend to keep valued employees in their jobs, but the
unavailability or lesser attractiveness of alternative employment should tend to depress the
compensation the employer needs to pay these ‘captive’ workers.”).
47. Garmaise, supra note 4, at 1 (emphasis added).
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drafting noncompetes that are quite broad and possibly unenforceable. This issue is obviously subject to empirical proof, but many
courts and commentators believe that employer overreach is a
significant problem,48 and anecdotal evidence supports this view.49
This tendency to overreach creates in terrorem effects: employees
will refrain from lawful, permissible behavior out of concern for
complying with the contract and avoiding litigation.50
The in terrorem effects are magnified—because employers are
more likely to overreach—in jurisdictions that allow “blue pencil-

48. Sullivan, supra note 27, at 1150 (discussing the widespread use of overbroad
noncompetition agreements). Although empirical evidence may be hard to come by,
“[c]oncerns about the in terrorem effects of [noncompetes] ... have been voiced with frequency.”
Arnow-Richman, Dilution of Employee Bargaining Power, supra note 2, at 966 n.10. Cynthia
Estlund states:
In both [noncompetes and arbitration agreements], employers have an
incentive to overreach—to use these agreements to impair employees’
inalienable rights, injure the public interest, or both. The loss of a valued
employee, especially to a competitor, is undesirable; the employer may be
tempted to secure as much insulation from that loss, and from that future
competition, as its market power will permit.
Estlund, Between Rights, supra note 20, at 412; see also Rachel Arnow-Richman, The Role of
Contract in the Modern Employment Relationship, 10 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 1, 5 (2003).
49. One anecdotal piece of evidence: During my time in practice, I was asked by one client
to draft a noncompete for all employees in a small company. I responded that the terms
suggested by the client would be unenforceable. The client responded: “I don’t care. I just don’t
want them to leave.”
50. See Estlund, Between Rights, supra note 20, at 406 (“An overbroad noncompete—one
that lasts too long or that covers activities that do not threaten the employer’s legitimate
interests—may deter the employee from quitting and competing even when she has a right
to do so, or it may deter a competitor from hiring the employee.”); see also Richard P. Rita
Pers. Servs. Int’l, Inc. v. Kot, 191 S.E.2d 79, 81 (Ga. 1972) (“For every covenant that finds its
way to court, there are thousands which exercise an in terrorem effect on employees who
respect their contractual obligations and on competitors who fear legal complications if they
employ a covenantor, or who are anxious to maintain gentlemanly relations with their
competitors. Thus, the mobility of untold numbers of employees is restricted by the
intimidation of restrictions whose severity no court would sanction.” (quoting Harlan M.
Blake, Employee Agreements Not To Compete, 73 HARV. L. REV. 625, 682-83 (1960))); Reddy
v. Cmty. Health Found. of Man, 298 S.E.2d 906, 916 (W. Va. 1982) (describing broad
noncompete provisions in employment agreements “where savage covenants are included in
employment contracts so that their overbreadth operates, by in terrorem effect, to subjugate
employees unaware of the tentative nature of such a covenant”). Even those commentators
who generally support the enforceability of noncompetes concede that overreaching—and its
effect on employees—may occur. See, e.g., Sterk, supra note 33, at 410 (“[B]y limiting the
number of attractive alternatives available to an employee, a restrictive covenant may in
some sense ‘coerce’ that employee to remain with his initial employer.”).
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ing,” or reformation of the contract to make it reasonable.51 Both
commentators and courts have noted the incentive to overreach
when blue penciling may occur.52 A Georgia court described the
dynamic as follows:
Employers covenant for more than is necessary, hope their
employees will thereby be deterred from competing, and rely on
the courts to rewrite the agreements so as to make them
enforceable if their employees do compete. When courts adopt
severability of covenants not to compete, employee competition
will be deterred even more than it is at present by these overly
broad covenants against competition.53

The in terrorem effects may even extend to other employers,
reducing employee mobility further. For example, one court,
refusing to blue pencil a noncompete covenant, stated that “[a]
prospective new employer ... could not read the [noncompete
provision] and know what sorts of activity would be prohibited and
what would not.”54 As a result, the court concluded “[a] current
employee may be frozen in his or her job by an unreasonably broad
covenant. Even if the employee believes the covenant is too broad,

51. Pivateau, supra note 42, at 690-91 (“In those states employing the [blue pencil]
doctrine, employers are effectively encouraged to enter into otherwise unenforceable
agreements.”); see also Valley Med. Specialists v. Farber, 982 P.2d 1277, 1286 (Ariz. 1999)
(“Employers may therefore create ominous covenants, knowing that if the words are
challenged, courts will modify the agreement to make it enforceable.”); Kot, 191 S.E.2d at 81
(“If severance is generally applied, employers can fashion truly ominous covenants with
confidence that they will be pared down and enforced when the facts of a particular case are
not unreasonable.”).
52. See, e.g., Philip J. Closius & Henry M. Schaffer, Involuntary Nonservitude: The
Current Judicial Enforcement of Employee Covenants Not To Compete—A Proposal for
Reform, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 531, 547 (1984) (“The ‘blue pencil rule’ and the ‘rewriting’ of
offending covenants illustrate another defect in the reasonableness approach. These practices
encourage employers to be ‘unreasonable’ in drafting covenants not to compete because there
is, in effect, no sanction for being unreasonable.”); Estlund, Between Rights, supra note 20, at
405 (“Judicial willingness to edit or reform agreements ... may invite employers to
overreach.”); Sullivan, supra note 27, at 1147 (“The effect is to reduce or eliminate any
incentive for employers to draft clauses that comply with the legal requirements and therefore
to encourage future use of exactly the same provision.”).
53. Howard Schultz & Assocs., Inc. v. Broniec, 236 S.E.2d 265, 269 (Ga. 1977).
54. Produce Action Int’l, Inc. v. Mero, 277 F. Supp. 2d 919, 930-31 (S.D. Ind. 2003).
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she may be able to test that proposition only through expensive and
risky litigation.”55
Another manifestation of the asymmetrical bargaining power is
that noncompete provisions are frequently presented after the
employee has already accepted the position, and sometimes months
or years later. The rise of standard-form, adhesive agreements in
the private employment context has only exacerbated this dynamic,
resulting in employment agreements that are presented in a
“delayed terms” manner, much the way shrinkwrap and clickwrap
contracts have presented a “pay now, terms later” situation.56
Although employees regularly negotiate salary and benefits before
accepting a job, noncompetition provisions are not often discussed,
but instead presented on the first day on the job or some time
thereafter.
Delayed terms—those presented after an employment agreement
has been negotiated, and often after the employee has begun work
—give rise to a host of problems in the employment context, and
with respect to noncompetition provisions in particular. Professor
Rachel Arnow-Richman describes the context in which noncompetes
are often presented, likening the presentation to that of shrinkwrap
contracts:
The use of boilerplate language in any context has long raised
questions about the validity of assent and the risk of overreaching by the drafter, concerns that are heightened where a delay
in providing terms impedes a party’s ability to consider the
transaction as a whole. In the employment context, such
concerns redouble given the nature of both the relationship and
the market. As compared with a purchase of goods, the individual employee is likely to have much more at stake in any one
“sale” and ultimately has very limited ability to reject or “return” the job once accepted. These limitations allow cubewrap
contracts to operate underground as a form of private legislation, rewriting the baseline common law and statutory rules that
protect employee rights and society generally.57
55. Id. at 931.
56. Arnow-Richman, Delayed Term, supra note 45, at 640 (“What has escaped wide notice
in the employment law literature is that standard form employment agreements frequently
follow this agreement-now-terms-later model of contracting.”).
57. Id. at 641.
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As Arnow-Richman suggests, cognitive biases only exacerbate the
dynamic of unequal bargaining power.58 People are not particularly
good at estimating the risk that something may go wrong. At the
outset of an employment relationship in particular, prospective
employees are unlikely to dwell upon the possibility of negative
outcomes that may or may not occur at some time in the future.59
58. Id. at 654-55. For a discussion of the cognitive and behavioral biases that place
employees in a particularly bad bargaining position vis-à-vis employers, see, for example,
Samuel Issacharoff, Contracting for Employment: The Limited Return of the Common Law,
74 TEX. L. REV. 1783, 1794-95 (1996) (analogizing the hiring stage to a first date, in which one
would not raise questions about dissolution of the relationship, and stating that “[t]he
inherent difficulty in discussing end-term arrangements at the point of initial courtship is
compounded by the general presumption of bargaining inequality for all but the most select
employees”); Walter Kamiat, Labor and Lemons: Efficient Norms in the Internal Labor Market
and the Possible Failures of Individual Contracting, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1953, 1958 (1996)
(describing difficulties on both sides of the employment bargain by stating that “[a]n employee
and employer contracting for employment fits [economist George Akerlof’s] model: each
possesses unique access to information—information regarding the quality of their
offers—that the other party would find highly relevant, but which neither party can easily
discover from the other”); Pauline T. Kim, Bargaining with Imperfect Information: A Study
of Worker Perceptions of Legal Protection in an At-Will World, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 105, 106
(1997) (“[W]orkers appear to systematically overestimate the protections afforded by law,
believing that they have far greater rights against unjust or arbitrary discharges than they
in fact have under an at-will contract.”); Cass R. Sunstein, Human Behavior and the Law of
Work, 87 VA. L. REV. 205, 240-43 (2001) (discussing the fact that people tend to have
“excessive optimism” and “inadequate foresight” about future risk, and that they “edit out”
low-probability events); see also Cynthia L. Estlund, How Wrong Are Employees About Their
Rights, and Why Does It Matter?, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 6, 8 (2002) [hereinafter Estlund, How
Wrong] (“In the context of a contract between a more- and a less-sophisticated party, in which
the former directly benefits from the misconceptions of the latter, a case can be made for
bringing the law into line with the optimistic beliefs of the less-sophisticated party.”); Cass
R. Sunstein, Switching the Default Rule, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 106, 108-10 (2002) (discussing the
“endowment effect” in the employment relationship). Even those scholars who urge
enforcement of noncompetes recognize some of the problematic aspects of the bargaining
process. See, e.g., Sterk, supra note 33, at 408-09 (“Deficiencies in information or imagination,
however, might lead employees to sign restrictive covenants that are not in their interest.”
(citing Freed & Polsby, supra note 41, at 1105-07; Lea S. VanderVelde, The Gendered Origins
of the Lumley Doctrine: Binding Men’s Consciences and Women’s Fidelity, 101 YALE L.J. 775,
852 (1992))).
59. Arnow-Richman, Delayed Term, supra note 45, at 654 (“Indeed, the period
immediately following hire is likely to be the one in which employees are most optimistic
about their future employment. Beliefs about the quality and duration of employment may
even be explicitly reinforced by management personnel who reassure the workers about their
prospects and treat the required written documents as ‘routine paperwork.’”). For more
general discussions of this topic, see, for example, Jean Braucher, Amended Article 2 and the
Decision To Trust the Courts: The Case Against Enforcing Delayed Mass-Market Terms,
Especially for Software, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 753; Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of
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Even assuming that an employer presents a noncompete provision
to the employee before she begins work, the issue is unlikely to be
salient at that point in the employment relationship. Unlike salary,
hours, or benefits, a noncompete provision takes effect, if at all, at
a point much later in time. “[N]on-compete agreements constrain
employees only in a fairly remote and uncertain future event; and
we may expect employees to overdiscount the likelihood of these
events or the importance of the rights at stake.”60
The combination of asymmetrical bargaining power, the form and
presentation of many noncompetes, and the cognitive biases involved in the negotiation of noncompetes means that the bargaining
process rarely conforms to the neoclassical vision of a freely negotiated, arms-length agreement. Many commentators have critiqued
noncompete law based on these bargaining power issues, suggesting
a variety of doctrinal fixes, but few have suggested an absolute rule
of unenforceability.61
Cognition and the Limits of Contract, 47 STAN. L. REV. 211 (1995); see also Sterk, supra note
33, at 408-09 (“An employee beginning a new job may discount or overlook the possibility that
she will later want to compete with her employer.”); Rena Mara Samole, Note, Real
Employees: Cognitive Psychology and the Adjudication of Noncompetition Agreements, 4 WASH.
U. J.L. & POL’Y 289, 301 (2000) (“[C]ognitive psychologists suggest that because neoclassical
economics ignores important limits on human cognition in situations involving risk or
uncertainty, it relies on an idealized and impossible view of human behavior.”).
60. Estlund, Between Rights, supra note 20, at 413 (“Cognitive biases or informational
asymmetries might thus aggravate concerns about the fairness of bargains struck at an
earlier point, especially at the outset of employment, when questions about the forum in
which one might later sue the employer, or about one’s ability to compete with the employer
after termination, are likely to tarnish the appeal of an applicant or new employee. All of this
might make it easier for employers to overreach and invade employee rights.”). Even this
assumes that employees can at some point fairly evaluate the legal effect of a noncompete,
and empirical evidence contradicts this assumption. See, e.g., Sullivan, supra note 27, at 113637 (“Empirical evidence that employees are unaware of even their most basic rights ...
suggests that it would not be hard to convince employees that an overbroad noncompetition
clause is valid.”).
61. Arnow-Richman concludes that “no doctrinal fix will fully solve the problem of
employer overreaching or employee oppression, because it does not alter the fundamental
imbalance that exists whenever a single individual deals with a larger entity.” ArnowRichman, Dilution of Employee Bargaining Power, supra note 2, at 992. Many employment
law scholars have suggested various doctrinal fixes. See, e.g., KATHERINE V.W. STONE, FROM
WIDGETS TO DIGITS: EMPLOYMENT REGULATION FOR THE CHANGING WORKPLACE 156 (2004)
(arguing that courts should “limit enforcement of noncompete covenants to the protection of
trade secrets narrowly defined”); Arnow-Richman, Dilution of Employee Bargaining Power,
supra note 2, at 984 (suggesting doctrinal changes that would “encourag[e] disclosure on the
front end of the employment relationship by refusing enforcement of cubewrap terms and
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2. Noncompetes Restrict Employee Mobility and the Free Flow of
Labor
At the risk of stating the obvious, noncompetes are problematic
because they restrict employee mobility, both in theory and in
practice.62 At its extreme, a noncompetition agreement would violate
the Thirteenth Amendment. That is, a complete restriction on postemployment labor is tantamount to involuntary servitude.63 It goes
without saying that such an agreement violates public policy
concerning slavery, the alienability of labor, and “the right to quit.”64
Given this background, even moderate restraints on postemployment activity have been viewed with suspicion.65 Although
employee noncompetes are enforceable in many states,66 American
statutory and common law evolved from this historical perspective,
which means that such agreements are examined more closely than
discourag[e] overbroad agreements by refusing judicial redrafting”); Closius & Schaffer, supra
note 52, at 548-49; Gillian Lester, Restrictive Covenants, Employee Training, and the Limits
of Transaction-Cost Analysis, 76 IND. L.J. 49, 72-74 (2001) (considering various alternative
approaches); Sterk, supra note 33, at 387 (arguing that all noncompetes, not just “reasonable”
noncompetes, ought to be enforceable); Sullivan, supra note 27, at 1177 (arguing against
“blue-penciling” but admitting that the solution “has its limits”); see also Katherine V.W.
Stone, The New Psychological Contract: Implications of the Changing Workplace for Labor and
Employment Law, 48 UCLA L. REV. 519, 577-80 (2001) (critiquing noncompete doctrine,
particularly as applied in a very mobile economy with limited employment security).
62. Even those who advocate for the enforcement of noncompetes would concede that this
is a concern, and the current doctrinal approach in the states acknowledges it is a concern.
See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
63. See Blake, supra note 50, at 650.
64. Estlund, Between Rights, supra note 20, at 408 (“An extremely broad waiver of the
right to work elsewhere after quitting, such as would be permitted under an ordinary
contractual treatment of [noncompete] agreements, comes very close in effect to contracting
away one’s inalienable right to quit. So the pall of the Thirteenth Amendment and its ban on
involuntary servitude hangs over these agreements.”); see also Oren Bar-Gill & Gideon
Parchomovsky, Law and the Boundaries of Technology-Intensive Firms, 157 U. PA. L. REV.
1649, 1667 (2009) (“Of course, the reach of these contractual restrictions and, correspondingly,
the extent of control that they provide are not unlimited. And it is the law that sets the
limits—limits that echo the slavery concerns raised by Hart.” (citing OLIVER HART, FIRMS,
CONTRACTS, AND FINANCIAL STRUCTURE 29 (1995))).
65. Sterk, supra note 33, at 411 (“When courts express hostility to restrictive covenants
in employment agreements on involuntary servitude grounds, they suggest in effect that the
right to choose how to use one’s ‘own’ human capital is an important element of personal
freedom.”). See generally Blake, supra note 50, at 629-37 (discussing the common law’s
suspicion of restraints on trade).
66. Noncompetes are unenforceable in a few states, including California. See CAL. BUS.
& PROF. CODE § 16600 (West 2008).
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most other commercial agreements.67 Even in the most permissive
states, noncompetes are unenforceable if they prevent an employee
from making a living or engaging in his or her profession of choice
entirely. To be enforceable, a noncompete must be limited in geographic scope, temporal scope, and in restrictions on future employment.68 In many jurisdictions, noncompetes must be supported by
consideration so that in theory the employee receives some kind of
benefit.69 Functionally, however, noncompetes operate unilaterally
in that the employee is burdened by postemployment restrictions,
but the employer may fire the employee at any time (assuming atwill employment) and is not required to pay the employee during
the restricted period.70
Noncompetes are certainly intended to restrict employee mobility.
An agreement may state, for example, that the employee
will not, during the period of [her] employment by the Company
and in the event that [her] employment with the Company is
terminated for any reason whatsoever and whether such
termination be voluntary or involuntary, for a period of three

67. See Sterk, supra note 33, at 395 (“For centuries, English and American courts have
carefully scrutinized restrictive covenants between employers and employees as ‘restraints
on trade.’”). In the majority of states, the approach varies in its details but is generally
consistent. By the common law or by statute, many states apply a “rule of reason” in which
the employee’s interest in being free of the restriction is balanced against the employer’s
“protectable interest.” The “public interest” is also often part of the calculation. See supra
notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
68. See, e.g., TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 15.50 (Vernon 2009) (“[A] covenant not to
compete is enforceable if it is ancillary to or part of an otherwise enforceable agreement at the
time the agreement is made to the extent that it contains limitations as to time, geographical
area, and scope of activity to be restrained that are reasonable and do not impose a greater
restraint than is necessary to protect the goodwill or other business interest of the
promisee.”).
69. The law in many states is in flux on this point. In some jurisdictions, at-will
employment, or continued at-will employment, is deemed sufficient consideration, but in other
states, the law requires some additional consideration. See, e.g., Lucht’s Concrete Pumping,
Inc. v. Horner, 224 P.3d 355, 359 (Colo. App. 2009) (“We are persuaded by the rationale in
these cases and in others that have similarly held that continued employment does not create
consideration for a noncompete agreement once an employee has begun working for an
employer.”), cert. granted, No. 095C627, 2010 WL 341383 (Colo. Feb. 1, 2010).
70. In England, noncompetes are enforceable, but the employer must pay the employee
during the postemployment restricted period. This is called “gardening leave.” ArnowRichman, Delayed Term, supra note 45, at 663 n.118.

2010]

THE WRONG TOOL FOR THE JOB

895

years (3) following such termination, (i) directly or indirectly
engage in any competitive business.71

This agreement seeks to limit, though not eliminate, the employee’s
ability to terminate her employment and secure another job.72 It
seems obvious that—all things being equal—it is in the employee’s
interest to be free of such restrictions.
The actual effects of the agreement on the individual employee
will likely vary. The employee may not have read or understood the
agreement, and it may, for that reason, have no effect whatsoever
on the employee’s behavior. In contrast, if the employee has read the
agreement or is otherwise aware of the noncompete, the agreement
may make it more likely that the employee will stay with the
employer, rather than leave to take advantage of other opportunities. This, of course, is precisely the point of a noncompete from the
employer’s perspective: retaining the employee and the investment
the employer has made in that employee while, at the same time,
preventing a competitor from gaining access to the skills, knowledge, or information possessed by the employee. One recent empirical study supports the intuition that noncompetes do in fact have
the effect of increasing employee retention by deterring employees
from departing. It concludes that “workers subject to non-competes
[tend] to stay with their employers.”73 This is one way, then, in
which noncompetes limit employee mobility.
Noncompetes may affect employee mobility in other ways. If an
employee decides, notwithstanding the noncompete, to terminate
71. Sample Agreement, supra note 38.
72. Sterk describes this situation as the epitome of the alienability of labor, and he views
it as a good thing, arguing that virtually all noncompetes—not just “reasonable”
noncompetes—ought to be enforceable. Sterk, supra note 33, at 412 (“These restrictions on
a person’s ability to alienate his own human capital have been justified in part by the need
to discourage anticompetitive behavior, in part by the need to protect employees from the
greater bargaining power of employers, and, most significantly, by the need to protect
individual freedom. None of those justifications, however, is entirely persuasive.”).
73. Matt Marx, Good Work If You Can Get It ... Again: Noncompete Agreements,
“Occupational Detours,” and Attainment 3 (Aug. 17, 2009) (unpublished manuscript),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1456748 [hereinafter Marx, Good Work]; see also Bruce Fallick,
Charles A. Fleischman & James B. Rebitzer, Job-Hopping in Silicon Valley: Some Evidence
Concerning the Microfoundations of a High-Technology Cluster, 88 REV. ECON. & STAT. 472,
481 (2006) (“Our finding of a California effect on mobility lends support to Gilson’s hypothesis
that the unenforceability of noncompete agreements under California state law enhances
mobility and agglomeration economies in IT clusters.”).
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her employment with an employer, or if an employee is fired or laid
off,74 such an employee may seek employment that conflicts with the
terms of the agreement, risking a lawsuit, or she may accept
employment in another field to avoid breaching the agreement.
Professor Matt Marx’s study concludes that these possibilities are
real. Workers subject to noncompetes often take “occupational detours,” which may not redound to their benefit.75 The “results
suggest that those who change jobs while subject to non-competes
may actually be taking a step backward in their careers.”76 The
implications of Marx’s study are significant. “Not only do non-competes discourage individuals from changing jobs to take advantage
of attractive opportunities; when workers subject to non-competes
nonetheless leave their jobs, their next step often becomes decidedly
unattractive: working surreptitiously within their field, leaving
their field, or not working at all.”77
Moreover, studies have demonstrated not only the individual
effects of noncompetes but also the effect on the flow of labor in
particular markets. In a fascinating study involving Michigan law
on noncompetes, Matt Marx, Deborah Strumsky, and Lee Fleming
concluded that employee mobility is in fact tied to the rule concerning the enforceability of noncompetes.78 Michigan created a perfect
setting for a study of the effects of the legal rule concerning noncompetes:79 the state legislature inadvertently (strange but true, apparently) changed the rule on noncompetes.80 They were unenforceable
74. Note that in the illustrative agreement the postemployment restrictions are in force
regardless of the reason the employment relationship terminated. See Sample Agreement,
supra note 38.
75. Marx, Good Work, supra note 73, at 3.
76. Id. at 4. Marx concludes that “[k]nowledge workers subject to non-competes find it
difficult to continue in their chosen profession when changing jobs, often leaving their field.”
Id. at 44.
77. Id. at 46 (citation omitted).
78. Marx, Strumsky & Fleming, supra note 44, at 876.
79. Id. at 878 (“Michigan is the only state we know to have clearly and inadvertently
reversed its enforcement policy in the past century. Given that Michigan’s shift in noncompete enforcement appears to have been exogenous, we propose that Michigan affords a
‘natural experiment’ with which to directly test the impact of non-competes on worker
mobility.”).
80. In 1985, the legislature passed the Michigan Antitrust Reform Act, which repealed a
large section of the state’s code, including the provision holding noncompetes unenforceable.
The abolition of that provision was apparently not the purpose of the statutory repeal and
was, evidently, neither intentional nor even noticed at the time. See id. at 877 (“Given that
the impetus for the change in law appears to have been general antitrust reform and not
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before 198581 but became enforceable thereafter.82 Drawing on
information in patent applications, the researchers found that “[t]he
job mobility of inventors in Michigan fell 8.1% following the policy
reversal compared to inventors in other states that continued to
proscribe non-competes, and these effects were amplified for those
with particular characteristics.”83 Other studies have documented
similar effects.84 Noncompetes are undoubtedly intended to restrict
the free flow of the labor market, and based on recent empirical
work, it appears that they achieve this goal.
Generally speaking, then, noncompetes are at odds with both the
fair bargaining process and efficiency underpinnings of the freedom
of contract rationale.85 Unlike the vast majority of contracts that are
consistent with and promote market exchange—and thus efficiency
—noncompetes also operate as interventions in the market. By their
very terms, they seek to reduce competition in the market for labor,
and it appears that they do have that effect.86 In short, they represent a fairly radical departure from the neoclassical model of
contract formation on which the freedom of contract principle is
based.
Based on these critiques, many scholars have argued for doctrinal
reforms of various sorts, though few, if any, have proposed a simple
specifically altering non-compete enforcement, it appears that the 1905 statute prohibiting
non-competes was inadvertently repealed as part of the antitrust reform.”).
81. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 445.761 (West 1967) (“All agreements and contracts by
which any person ... agrees not to engage in any avocation [or] employment ... are hereby
declared to be against public policy and illegal and void.”).
82. The provision prohibiting the enforcement of noncompetes was repealed, and lawyers
and employers in Michigan soon realized that they could impose such terms on employees.
Marx, Strumsky & Fleming, supra note 44, at 877-78.
83. Id. at 876 (“Michigan inventors with skills one standard deviation above the mean in
their firm-specificity experienced a decrease in their job mobility of 15.4%.”).
84. Fallick, Fleischman & Rebitzer, supra note 73, at 481 (“Our finding of a California
effect on mobility lends support to Gilson’s hypothesis that the unenforceability of noncompete
agreements under California state law enhances mobility and agglomeration economies in IT
clusters.”). For a discussion of Gilson’s argument, see infra notes 173-81 and accompanying
text.
85. See Arnow-Richman, Delayed Term, supra note 45, at 639. “The proliferation of
cubewrap contracts poses a significant challenge to those who might otherwise support
private ordering in setting and policing the terms of employment relationships.” Id. at 641
(arguing for mandatory disclosure of standard-form employment agreements).
86. See, e.g., Estlund, Between Rights, supra note 20, at 411-12 (“Non-compete agreements
obviously stifle competition; they run into the venerable public policy against contracts in
restraint of trade.”).
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rule of unenforceability. This is understandable, perhaps, given the
general force of the freedom of contract rationale; contract law
doctrine does not generally allow for the possibility of making
classes or types of contracts unenforceable.87
Viewing the issue through a broader lens, however, and using
that perspective to reevaluate the use and enforceability of noncompetes, it becomes clear that doctrinal fixes are insufficient to
address the problems created by noncompetes. Instead, they should
simply be unenforceable.
II. THE FAILURE OF THE IP JUSTIFICATION
Although many scholars have persuasively critiqued the use of
noncompetes as a problematic aspect of the employment relationship, few have acknowledged or addressed the most common argument proffered for noncompetes, the IP justification.88 A thorough
reexamination of noncompetes is incomplete without this perspective. Upon closer examination, it becomes clear that firms use
noncompetes as tools for protecting IP. So understood, noncompetes
must be evaluated by the metrics of IP protection, and applying
those criteria, the IP justification fails. Noncompetes are simply the
wrong tool for the IP job.
In this Part, I first demonstrate the ubiquity of the IP justification for noncompetes and summarize the general purposes and goals
of IP protection. Based on that background, I then argue that
noncompetes fail to serve—and indeed conflict with—these purposes
and goals.
The IP justification fails because noncompetes are simply not a
good tool for protecting intangible assets.89 Moreover, permitting
their use interferes with the goals of the IP regimes. A refusal to enforce the agreements would better serve the purposes of providing
IP protection by channeling efforts to protect intangibles to the IP
regimes. To countenance noncompetes permits firms an end run
87. But see Sullivan, supra note 27, at 1131 & n.16.
88. IP scholars have assumed that noncompetes operate as a form of IP protection, but
few, if any, have challenged the justification. See, e.g., Bar-Gill & Parchomovsky, supra note
64, at 1655 (discussing covenants not to compete as a “nonproperty source of control” over IP);
Jonathan M. Barnett, Is Intellectual Property Trivial?, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1691, 1706 (2009)
(discussing noncompetes as an alternative method of IP protection).
89. See infra Part II.B.
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around the requirements of the IP regimes without the tradeoffs
those regimes entail. In addition, even if additional forms of protection are needed, noncompetition agreements fail to serve the
policy goals of IP protection.
A. The Misplaced IP Justification for Noncompetes
Firms and courts regularly justify noncompetes with the asserted
need to protect IP or IP-like assets, but this use of noncompetes has
escaped the attention of many scholars.90 The IP justification is
often explicit: noncompetes are necessary to protect a firm’s trade
secrets, for example. Even when it is not explicit, the IP justification
emerges implicitly when proponents argue that noncompetes are
necessary to encourage invention, disclosure, and investment in
employees. Employers and courts also put forth a more general
argument about the “business necessity” served by noncompetes,
contending that they are necessary to protect the employer’s
legitimate interests.91 This argument, upon closer examination, is
merely another iteration of the IP justification. In Part II.A.1, I
elaborate on this point, making clear the regularity with which the
IP justification is proffered. I then briefly describe the purposes and
goals of the IP regimes, because, to the extent that noncompetes are
used as tools for protecting IP, they must be evaluated in light of
those purposes and goals.
1. The IP Justification for Noncompetes
There are at least two versions of the IP justification. Sometimes
the justification is explicit: firms or courts will assert that noncompetes are necessary to protect trade secrets or other intangible
assets.92 Other times, the argument is implicit or attenuated, but
90. But see Rachel S. Arnow-Richman, Bargaining for Loyalty in the Information Age: A
Reconsideration of the Role of Substantive Fairness in Enforcing Employee Noncompetes, 80
OR. L. REV. 1163, 1182-85 (2001) [hereinafter Arnow-Richman, Bargaining for Loyalty].
91. See, e.g., id.
92. See Katherine V.W. Stone, Knowledge at Work: Disputes Over the Ownership of
Human Capital in the Changing Workplace, 34 CONN. L. REV. 721, 746 (2002) [hereinafter
Stone, Knowledge at Work] (“A court will not enforce a covenant if it is solely a means to
restrain trade. Rather, the long-standing view has been that to be enforceable, a covenant not
to compete must protect an employer’s interest in a trade secret or in other ‘confidential
information.’”).
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should be understood as another version of the IP justification. In
either case, upon closer examination, it becomes obvious that
noncompetes are primarily used to protect IP or IP-like assets.
The explicit IP justification is regularly cited and appears to be
widely accepted and generally uncontroversial. It is often asserted
that noncompetes are necessary for the protection of trade secrets
and other forms of IP.93 Noncompete agreements regularly cite trade
secrets or confidential information as the “protectable interest”
sought to be guarded with the contract.94 An agreement may state,
for example: “I understand that this Section ... is not meant to
prevent me from earning a living or fostering my career. It does
intend, however, to prevent any competitive business from gaining
any unfair advantage from my knowledge of Proprietary Information.”95 Proprietary information is often defined quite broadly, but
generally refers to IP or IP-like intangibles.96
Courts regularly justify noncompetes by reference to the need to
protect trade secrets.97 State law sometimes makes the connection
explicit. Colorado law, for example, provides that noncompetes are
unenforceable except in a few circumstances, one of which is a
contract for the purpose of protecting trade secrets.98 In California,
notwithstanding a recent ruling reaffirming the state’s prohibition

93. Although there is some dispute, trade secrets are generally deemed to be a form of IP.
On the varying descriptions of and justifications for trade secret law, see Mark A. Lemley, The
Surprising Virtues of Treating Trade Secrets as IP Rights, 61 STAN. L. REV. 311, 319-29 (2008)
[hereinafter Lemley, Surprising Virtues]. Lemley argues “that trade secrets are best conceived
as IP rights, and that, as IP rights, they work—they serve the basic purposes of IP laws.” Id.
at 329; see also Bar-Gill & Parchomovsky, supra note 64, at 1676 (“Despite their weak
proprietary status, the protection afforded to trade secrets is broad and strong.”).
94. Nolo, Noncompete Agreements: How To Create an Agreement You Can Enforce,
http://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/article-29784.html (last visited Nov. 12, 2010) (“Use
a noncompete agreement to prevent losing valuable trade secrets and employees.”).
95. Sample Agreement, supra note 38 (emphasis added). Note that this agreement
acknowledges the tensions created by noncompetes and asserts that it is not intended to be
overly restrictive.
96. See id.
97. See, e.g., Comprehensive Techs. Int’l, Inc. v. Software Artisans, Inc., 3 F.3d 730, 739
(4th Cir. 1993) (“When an employee has access to confidential and trade secret information
crucial to the success of the employer’s business, the employer has a strong interest in
enforcing a covenant not to compete because other legal remedies often prove inadequate.”);
see also Arnow-Richman, Bargaining for Loyalty, supra note 90, at 1184-85.
98. COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-2-113 (2009) (stating that noncompetes for the purpose of
protecting trade secrets may be enforceable).
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on noncompetes,99 firms continue to assert that such agreements are
necessary to protect their trade secrets and that a common law
“trade secrets” exception applies to the California rule.100 And
commentators agree that employers generally use noncompetes to
protect IP or IP-like assets.101
The Fourth Circuit provides a classic example in its opinion in
Comprehensive Technologies International, Inc. v. Software Artisans,
Inc.102 In that case, Comprehensive Technologies International (CTI)
sued a former employee, Dean Hawkes, for copyright infringement,
trade secret misappropriation, and breach of a noncompete, among
other claims.103 The Fourth Circuit upheld the trial court’s rejection
of the copyright claim104 and the trade secret claim105 on the grounds
that there were no trade secrets and, even if there were, that they
were not misappropriated. The court permitted CTI to pursue its
noncompete claim, however, stating that the noncompete was
necessary in order to protect CTI’s trade secrets and other confidential information.106 In other words, the court accepted the IP
99. See Edwards v. Arthur Andersen L.L.P., 189 P.3d 285, 293 (Cal. 2008).
100. See, e.g., Dowell v. Biosense Webster, Inc., 102 Cal. Rptr. 3d 1, 11 (Ct. App. 2009)
(“Biosense argues that the [noncompete] clauses in the agreements are narrowly tailored to
protect trade secrets and confidential information because they are ‘tethered’ to the use of
confidential information, and are triggered only when the former employee’s services for a
competitor implicate the use of confidential information.”). It should be noted that the
noncompete agreements signed by these California employees contained New Jersey choice
of law and consent-to-venue clauses. Id. at 4. The court did not address these provisions or
explain why it was applying California law.
101. Arnow-Richman, Delayed Term, supra note 45, at 638-39 (concluding that employers
regularly use standard-form agreements for, among other reasons, “augmenting their trade
secret rights”); see also Estlund, Between Rights, supra note 20, at 416 (“Some noncompetes—those that protect employers’ trade secrets—may thus be justified as necessary to
protect independently recognized employer rights.”); Michael V. Risch, Economic Analysis of
Labor and Employment Law in the New Economy: Proceedings of the 2008 Annual Meeting,
Association of American Law Schools, Section on Law and Economics, 12 EMP. RTS. & EMP.
POL’Y J. 339, 340 n.43 (2008).
102. 3 F.3d 730 (4th Cir. 1993) (rejecting the employer’s trade secrets claim because of a
lack of trade secrets but upholding the noncompete on the basis of protecting trade secrets
and other confidential information). I call this a classic example because it is one that has
been used regularly in discussions of noncompetes. See, e.g., ROBERT P. MERGES, PETER S.
MENELL & MARK A. LEMLEY, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 96
(5th ed. 2010); Arnow-Richman, Bargaining for Loyalty, supra note 90, at 1184-85.
103. Software Artisans, Inc., 3 F.3d at 732.
104. Id. at 735.
105. Id. at 737.
106. Id. at 739 (“When an employee has access to confidential and trade secret information
crucial to the success of the employer’s business, the employer has a strong interest in
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justification despite concluding that the employer did not prevail on
either IP claim! Thus, the IP justification may carry the day even
when untethered from trade secret or other IP rights.
A common corollary to the form of the IP justification discussed
above is that trade secret law on its own is too limited and thus
insufficient to protect the employer’s information.107 In other words,
the assumption is that it is easier to prevent an employee from
working for Company X than it is to ensure that particular kinds of
information will not be leaked from the employee’s head to the new
employer.108 Employers thus use noncompetes in part “to provide an
extra layer of protection.”109 For example, attorneys often advise
clients to use noncompetes to “identify and correct potential holes
in their trade secrets protection strategies.”110 A World Intellectual
Property Organization commentary on “Trade Secrets and Employee
Loyalty” has a subsection titled “Employees are the Biggest Threat”
and suggests that contracts, including noncompetes, may be desir-

enforcing a covenant not to compete because other legal remedies often prove inadequate....
On the facts of this case, we conclude that the scope of the employment restrictions is no
broader than necessary to protect CTI’s legitimate business interests.”).
107. Arnow-Richman, Dilution of Employee Bargaining Power, supra note 2, at 983 n.71
(“Indeed, it is widely assumed by lawyers that [noncompetes] can provide additional
protection for intellectual property interests beyond what is afforded under common law.”);
see, e.g., Stone, Knowledge at Work, supra note 92, at 747 (“The historical link between
noncompete covenants and trade secrets is somewhat paradoxical because disclosure of trade
secrets and confidential information can be restrained in the absence of a covenant. However,
it has been argued that, for procedural reasons, it is difficult to obtain enforcement of a trade
secret, so that a restrictive covenant provides employers with important additional
protection.”).
108. Risch, supra note 101, at 340 n.43 (explaining that with trade secret law, “[e]mployers
must prove that ex-employees misappropriated information, ... which is more difficult than
simply proving that they are competing”).
109. Estlund, Between Rights, supra note 20, at 416.
110. Seyfarth Shaw, http://www.seyfarth.com/index.cfm/fuseaction/practice_area.practice_
area/practice_area.cfm (follow “Trade Secrets, Computer Fraud & Non-Competes” hyperlink)
(last visited Nov. 12, 2010) (listing four strategies to compensate for the “holes” in trade secret
protection); see also Frost Brown Todd, http://www.fbtemployerlaw.com/lande/ncts/
NewsDetail.aspx?newsShortId=355 (last visited Nov. 12, 2010) (indicating that noncompetes
may be the “best of all worlds” for a variety of reasons, including that other methods of
protection, including nondisclosure agreements, do not prevent “competitive damage” from
occurring). One Minnesota attorney stated with respect to noncompetes, “The nature of the
modern economy means companies have to be service-oriented and idea-oriented, and many
smaller companies are seeing the need to protect those ideas any way they can.” Dan
Heilman, Noncompetes Have Teeth in Minnesota 2 (May 7, 2007), http://laurielaurie.com/
noncompetes1.pdf.
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able because they “enhance legal protection of trade secrets.”111 That
is, noncompetes are justified on the need to protect trade secrets
and on the need to protect things that are not trade secrets.
Even when the IP justification is not explicit, it is often implicit.
Many justifications for noncompetes are not framed in terms of IP
protection, but they involve efforts to protect “confidential information,” “investments in human capital,” “proprietary information,”
and the like. Proponents of noncompetes, courts and lawyers alike,
justify noncompetes with general references to “legitimate business
interests,” “business necessity,” and the need to prevent “unfair
competition,” often without more.112 Moreover, many argue that
noncompetition agreements are necessary to provide firms an
incentive to invest in the training of employees and to encourage
disclosure of information to employees that increases the efficiency
and productivity of the firm. Professor Sterk, for example, argues
that noncompete enforcement is necessary to “assur[e] that em-

111. Talhiya Sheikh, Trade Secrets and Employee Loyalty, http://www.wipo.int/sme/en/
documents/trade_secrets_employee_loyalty.html (last visited Nov. 12, 2010).
112. Although in the majority of cases these claims about business necessity are likely
made in good faith, we ought to be suspicious of imposing restrictions on employee mobility
based on such conclusory assertions. That is, if in fact there is no business necessity or
legitimate interest, a noncompetition agreement ought not to be countenanced. Indeed, the
balancing tests, used by many states to evaluate noncompetes, contemplate some proof of the
employer’s legitimate interest in imposing the noncompete. As a practical matter, however,
it appears that in many litigated cases there is little, if any, evidence presented concerning
the actual scope and nature of the employer’s interest. Discussing Comprehensive
Technologies International v. Software Artisans, Rachel Arnow-Richman stated,
Having dismissed the trade secret claim, however, the court went on to conclude
that the employer had demonstrated a legitimate interest in confidential
information justifying enforcement of the employee’s noncompete.
... The only additional explanation or source proffered in the opinion to
support this generalized conclusion was the fact that the employment agreement
containing the noncompete recited that the employee would have access to
confidential and secret information.
Such rote conclusions are typical of many cases involving the assertion of
confidential information as a protectable interest.
Arnow-Richman, Bargaining for Loyalty, supra note 90, at 1184-85. More importantly,
perhaps, the vast majority of noncompetes are not litigated and subjected to the requirement
of proof. There is thus little incentive for employers to carefully evaluate the “business
necessities” motivating the use of the noncompete agreement as it will never be held to proof
in court. To the extent that courts do not often require much specificity, the incentive is
accordingly reduced even further. We should thus expect that noncompetes are used more
than is necessary—assuming they are necessary at all, a point I do not concede—and that
they are overbroad in their operation.
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ployees acquire optimal levels of information and client contact.”113
Boiled down, these various formulations all refer to intangible
assets—as opposed to the tangible assets of a firm, such as computers and factories—and it is intangibles that the IP regimes are
designed to address. In addition, the incentive arguments are classic
justifications for the grant of IP rights.
2. Intellectual Property Policy
Given that both state and federal law provide a variety of
mechanisms for protecting intangibles, the IP justification for
noncompetes deserves close scrutiny. And to evaluate this justification, we must turn to IP law. Only by looking to the current scope
of protection and the purposes of IP law can we determine whether
and to what extent the IP justification for noncompetes is persuasive.
Because the most common form of the IP justification refers to the
limitations of trade secret law, I focus on that field here. However,
firms’ IP and IP-like assets may be protected in a variety of ways,
and employers have a number of legal mechanisms to protect their
intangibles. Trade secrets are protected through a separate body of
law: the Uniform Trade Secrets Act has been adopted by forty-five
states, the District of Columbia, and the U.S. Virgin Islands,114 and
operates generally to provide penalties for the misappropriation of
trade secrets, as defined by the Act.115 Federal patent and copyright

113. Sterk, supra note 33, at 394 (“Long-term contracts, enforceable by restrictive
injunction, provide a mechanism for insuring against such losses and thus for assuring that
employees acquire optimal levels of information and client contact.”); see, e.g., Paul H. Rubin
& Peter Shedd, Human Capital and Covenants Not To Compete, 10 J. LEGAL STUD. 93, 93
(1981) (“In particular, restrictive covenants were and are necessary in some circumstances
to lead to efficient amounts of investment in human capital.”). This argument focuses on the
enforcement of and remedies for breach of employment contracts. It is unclear, however, that
employers are interested in entering into long-term employment contracts with many
employees; most employment in the United States is at will. It is of course possible that longterm contracts encourage optimal investment in employees and optimal disclosure of
information to employees. I am not certain, however, that the argument translates to
noncompetes.
114. Uniform Law Commissioners, A Few Facts About the Uniform Trade Secrets Act,
http://www.nccusl.org/Update/uniformact_factsheets/uniformacts-fs-utsa.asp (last visited Nov.
12, 2010).
115. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT §§ 1-4 (1985).
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statutes provide more robust protection for inventions and creations.116
In addition to the statutory protections, common law duties offer
employers legal protection for their intangible assets. Employees
generally have common law duties of confidentiality and loyalty;117
even if information is not deemed a trade secret, an employee may
not disclose confidential information of the employer.118 Because of
fiduciary and agency responsibilities, employees may not compete
with their employers during the term of employment, though they
may prepare to compete while employed and then compete following
termination of the employment relationship (in the absence of a
noncompete, of course).119 Moreover, a variety of contractual mechanisms are available to reinforce these common law duties:
nondisclosure and confidentiality agreements are widely used and
unquestionably enforceable.120 Even with this briefest of overviews,
it should be clear that employers are not without legal mechanisms
for protecting their intangible assets and protecting against “unfair
competition” from former employees.121 This fact must be taken into
account in considering the IP justification for noncompetes.
The primary justifications for granting IP rights are the desire to
provide an incentive to invent and create, and an incentive to
disclose those inventions and creations.122 The conferral of IP rights
by the state is deemed necessary because intellectual assets are
public goods; once they are disclosed they are nonrivalrous and
nonexcludable. That is, anyone may use intangibles without
116. See, e.g., Bar-Gill & Parchomovsky, supra note 64, at 1671-81 (discussing the role of
patent law and copyright law in promoting and governing innovation).
117. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 387 cmt. b (1958).
118. Id. § 387 cmt. d.
119. Jet Courier Serv., Inc. v. Mulei, 771 P.2d 486, 492-93 (Colo. 1989).
120. See, e.g., IDX Sys. Corp. v. Epic Sys. Corp., 285 F.3d 581, 585 (2002) (holding that the
reasons for limiting enforcement of noncompetes do not apply to confidentiality agreements).
121. The law generally attempts to distinguish between “fair” and “unfair” competition. The
cases distinguishing “preparing to compete” from “competing,” for example, seek to draw that
line. See generally Scott W. Fielding, Free Competition or Corporate Theft?: The Need for
Courts To Consider the Employment Relationship in Preliminary Steps Disputes, 52 VAND. L.
REV. 201, 206-07 (1999); Sullivan, supra note 27, at 1148-49 (“While the law ... recognizes
legitimate reasons for an employer to seek protection from competition from former
[employees], the limitations it imposes reflect a countervailing recognition that illegitimate
employer interests may also be served by noncompetition agreements.”).
122. Lemley, Surprising Virtues, supra note 93, at 329 (stating that IP rights “promote
inventive activity and they promote disclosure of those inventions”).

906

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52:873

affecting anyone else’s enjoyment of them, and access to them is
difficult if not impossible to restrict.123 Because of these characteristics, the concern is that in the absence of legal protection, insufficient investment will be made in the creation or invention of
intangibles.124 Thus the grant of property-like rights is thought
necessary to encourage creation of those “goods.”125 This protection
is expressly utilitarian: rights are granted to the extent that the
benefits exceed the costs.126 The utilitarian approach entails an
attempt to confer only the type and strength of rights sufficient to
encourage invention or creation, and dissemination, but no more.127
For example, in the absence of patent rights, we would be
concerned that companies or individuals would not invest in the
research and development that leads to innovation, and we would
be concerned that the innovations would not be disclosed to the
public. Thus we grant a patent right, even though it is a form of
monopoly, to encourage the invention and its disclosure to the
public.128 Patent rights are relatively strong, providing a right to
123. See MERGES, MENELL & LEMLEY, supra note 102, at 12-14 (discussing nonexcludability
and nonrivalrousness).
124. See Lemley, Surprising Virtues, supra note 93, at 329 (“[P]atents and copyrights are
generally acknowledged to serve a utilitarian purpose—the grant of legal control encourages
the development of new and valuable information by offering the prospect of supracompetitive
returns, returns possible only if the developer does not face competition by others who use the
same idea. In this way, patents and copyrights avoid the risk of underinvestment inherent
with public goods, which are more costly to invent than to imitate once invented.”). For a more
in-depth discussion of this issue, see Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in
Intellectual Property Law, 75 TEX. L. REV. 989, 993-1000 (1997).
125. Dan L. Burk & Brett H. McDonnell, The Goldilocks Hypothesis: Balancing Intellectual
Property Rights at the Boundary of the Firm, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 575, 583 (“[P]rivate
individuals will generally lack incentives to produce an adequate level of public goods. A key
point of intellectual property is to help lessen the public good nature of new ideas by giving
creators the ability to legally exclude others from using the ideas.”).
126. See Barnett, supra note 88, at 1699-1700 (“Virtually all students learn, many
academic commentaries repeat, and countless judicial opinions state that stronger or weaker
intellectual property always involves an unavoidable tradeoff between increasing innovation
incentives (and resulting innovation gains), which result from stronger intellectual property,
and reducing access costs, which result from weaker intellectual property.”).
127. See, e.g., Burk & McDonnell, supra note 125, at 577 (considering a variety of forms of
IP protection and arguing “that intellectual property rights that are improperly calibrated,
that are either too strong or too weak, will lead to inefficient firm and market structures”);
see also Andrea Fosfuri & Thomas Rønde, High-Tech Clusters, Technology Spillovers, and
Trade Secret Laws, 22 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 45 (2004) (concluding that “trade secret protection
based on punitive damages, except in some extreme cases, is beneficial for firms’ profits,
stimulates clustering, and is not an impediment to workers’ mobility”).
128. See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 9 (1966) (noting Thomas Jefferson’s
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exclude for twenty years129 in exchange for disclosure to the public130
and the injection of the invention into the public domain once the
patent term expires. Similarly, copyright law involves an effort to
encourage the creation and dissemination of original expression,
providing a long term of protection but also a number of exceptions
and defenses that allow for various kinds of public uses.131 Trade
secret protection is a creature of state law, and it often operates as
an alternative or a supplement to the federal protections for
intangibles, protecting all kinds of “valuable” and “secret” information.132 As with copyright and patent law, it is generally animated
by a utilitarian philosophy; it is thought that trade secret protection
is necessary to provide a further incentive for innovation.133
Broadly speaking, patent, copyright, and trade secret law each
have their own internal balancing mechanisms—the strength of the
rights granted versus the number and type of defenses, for example.
Professor Jonathan Barnett describes the conventional wisdom
concerning this utilitarian approach:
This tradeoff assumes that more intellectual property generates
social harm by reducing access to intellectual goods, but
generates social benefits by enhancing anticipated profits and
thereby enhancing innovation incentives. Conversely, less
intellectual property generates social benefits by expanding
access to intellectual goods but generates social harm by
reducing anticipated profits and thereby reducing innovation
incentives. Hence, the policy challenge lies in setting intellectual
property coverage so as always to yield a net social gain.134
recognition of the difficulty of “drawing a line between the things which are worth to the
public the embarrassment of an exclusive patent, and those which are not” (quoting Letter
from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13, 1813), reprinted in 6 WRITINGS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 181 (H.A. Washington ed., John C. Riker 1857))).
129. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2006).
130. Id. § 112.
131. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (fair use); id. § 302 (duration of copyright).
132. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4)(i) (1985) (defining a trade secret as “information” that
“derives independent economic value ... from not being generally known to, and not being
readily ascertainable by proper means by, other persons”). On the differing and inconsistent
justifications for trade secret law, see Lemley, Surprising Virtues, supra note 93, at 331
(“[T]he additional incentive provided by trade secret law is important for innovation.”).
133. Lemley, Surprising Virtues, supra note 93, at 319.
134. Barnett, supra note 88, at 1693-94 (describing the standard explanation for the
conferral of IP rights). Barnett argues, however, that IP rights do not tell the whole story.
Instead, to understand and evaluate the IP regimes, one must look to nonproperty forms of
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Some argue for stronger IP rights, whereas others contend that we
have gone too far in terms of patent rights or copyright protection,
for example.135 The proper balance within each of the IP regimes is,
of course, a matter of great dispute, but few would disagree that the
IP regimes seek to find this balance.136
It is also generally understood that the IP regimes do not operate
in isolation.137 Rather, the protections provided by each must be
understood in terms of, and balanced against, the others. For
example, and most pertinent here, some of the contours of trade
secret law have developed and been interpreted by reference to
other forms of IP protection.138 Taking this view across the IP
regimes, certain kinds of intangibles—valuable inventions that are
self-disclosing, for example—are channeled to the patent system,
which allows for public disclosure of inventions, among other
things.139 Other forms of legal protection may protect some invenprotection as well. Id. at 1693 (“[F]irms generally can—and do—exploit devices other than
intellectual property to limit access to, and thereby appropriate returns from, innovation
investments. Hence, intellectual goods that are unprotected by intellectual property may still
be protected directly or indirectly by other legal or extralegal mechanisms, which broadly
include technology, contract, organizational form, and various complementary assets.”).
135. LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW
TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY xvi (2004) (“But just as a free market is
perverted if its property becomes feudal, so too can a free culture be queered by extremism
in the property rights that define it. That is what I fear about our culture today. It is against
that extremism that this book is written.”).
136. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 146 (1989) (“From their
inception, the federal patent laws have embodied a careful balance between the need to
promote innovation and the recognition that imitation and refinement through imitation are
both necessary to invention itself and the very lifeblood of a competitive economy.”); see also
Burk & McDonnell, supra note 125, at 577 (positing a “‘Goldilocks hypothesis’ for intellectual
property rights and the firm: like the size of a chair, the temperature of a porridge, or the
firmness of a mattress, the provision of intellectual property rights should not vary too far to
one extreme or another, but must be calibrated so that it is ‘just right’”). For an argument that
the balance should be shifted significantly in the direction of stronger rights, see, for example,
Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265, 290
(1977) (advocating relatively strong patent rights: “defined property rights in information
significantly lower the costs of transactions concerning such information”).
137. See Viva R. Moffat, Mutant Copyrights and Backdoor Patents: The Problem of
Overlapping Intellectual Property Protection, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1473, 1512 (2004)
(arguing that “overlapping protection disrupts the federal intellectual property system,
frustrates the patent and copyright bargains, and meddles with the incentive structures”).
138. See infra note 155.
139. See Lemley, Surprising Virtues, supra note 93, at 341 (“Taken together, the secrecy
requirement and the relative weakness of the trade secret law help ensure that the law
protects those who would otherwise rely on secrecy without law, and encourages disclosure
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tions that are not patentable, but some may receive no protection at
all, as a matter of public policy. For example, an invention that is
not “novel” for the purposes of patent law is deemed part of the
public domain and free for all to copy.140
The balancing between the IP regimes is most clear in cases
discussing the relationship between trade secret law and patent
law. In Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., the Supreme Court held
that federal patent law did not preempt Ohio’s trade secret law,141
emphasizing the narrowness of the state law.142 If trade secret law
was to provide more robust protection, for example, by prohibiting
reverse engineering or protecting against independent invention,
under the reasoning in Kewanee it would likely be preempted because it would be too similar to the protections provided by federal
patent law. “The Court reasoned that there was ‘remote’ risk that
holders of patentable inventions would choose trade secret protection because trade secret law provides far weaker protection than
patent protection.”143 Some trade secret doctrines—in particular the
rule permitting reverse engineering—thus serve a channeling
function, directing some inventions to the patent regime, some to
trade secret protection, and some to the public domain. In other
in those cases, while not displacing patent law as the means of protection for self-disclosing
inventions. Put another way, the secrecy requirement channels particular inventors to the
form of IP protection that best achieves the goals of society.”); see also MERGES, MENELL &
LEMLEY, supra note 102, at 82 (“Reverse engineering may be explained as a legal rule
designed to weaken trade secret protection relative to patent protection.”). This is the theory,
at least. It is an empirical question whether the weakness of state law actually propels
inventors to the patent office. There is some reason to think that inventors may at times
prefer trade secret protection even for patentable inventions. See Sharon K. Sandeen,
Kewanee Revisited: Returning to First Principles of Intellectual Property Law To Determine
the Issue of Federal Preemption, 12 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 299, 324 (2009).
140. See, e.g., Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 257 (1979) (noting that one
purpose of the patent system is “to assure that ideas in the public domain remain there for
the free use of the public”).
141. 416 U.S. 470, 492 (1974).
142. The Court pointed out that Ohio’s trade secret statute provided a cause of action only
when there had been improper use of the trade secret under circumstances in which a duty
existed not to so misuse the trade secret. Id. at 475-76. The Court also discussed the various
circumstances in which discovery of a trade secret does not constitute misappropriation:
independent invention, accidental disclosure, and reverse engineering. Id. at 476. The Court
relied on the very weakness of trade secret law in determining that it could coexist with
federal patent law. Id. at 489-90. For a thorough discussion of Kewanee and the relationship
between state trade secret law and federal patent law, see Sandeen, supra note 139, at 32425.
143. Sandeen, supra note 139, at 324.
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words, the specific contours of trade secret law are part of the
utilitarian effort to balance the rights afforded to individuals with
the benefits flowing to the public.
The channeling function provided by some aspects of trade secret
law is not an anomaly. A variety of IP doctrines are channeling
rules, directing protection to one regime or the other, or to the
public domain. Copyright law’s useful article doctrine provides that
“useful articles” may not be copyrighted because such items belong
in the patent realm or the public domain.144 Similarly, trademark’s
functionality doctrine dictates that “functional” marks may not be
protected by the trademark regime because to allow such protection
would be, in essence, a backdoor patent achieved without satisfying
the rigors of a patent examination.145 A variety of subject matter
rules perform similar channeling functions.146 Just as there are
disputes about the proper balance within any one area of protection,
one may of course dispute the proper balance between trade secret
law and patent law, for example, or between copyright law and
patent law. But there is no doubt that attempting to find this
balance is fundamental to the IP ecosystem. In other words, one
cannot evaluate any particular IP doctrine in a vacuum; some
attention must be given to the broader picture.
Because noncompetes are regularly used as—and justified as—a
form of IP protection,147 their use must be evaluated in light of IP
policy and the availability of other forms of IP protection. The
various IP regimes seek to achieve some kind of balance between
public access to inventive and creative products and the rights
necessary to provide an incentive for the creation and invention of
those products.148 The balance that has been struck may hardly be
144. Brandir Int’l, Inc. v. Cascade Pac. Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142, 1146-47 (2d Cir. 1987).
145. TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 29 (2001).
146. Copyright’s idea/expression dichotomy is one example. See Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S.
99, 102 (1879) (“To give to the author of the book an exclusive property in the art described
therein, when no examination of its novelty has ever been officially made, would be a surprise
and a fraud upon the public. That is the province of letters-patent, not of copyright.”). Patent
law’s refusal to protect abstract ideas is another example. See Funk Bros. Seed v. Kalo
Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948) (noting that abstract ideas are “manifestations of ...
nature, free to all men and reserved exclusively to none”). Trade secret’s requirement of
secrecy performs a channeling function as disclosure is required in order to obtain a patent;
thus an inventor must make an election between the two regimes.
147. See supra note 88.
148. See supra note 136.
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described as perfect, but permitting alternative means of protecting
IP—such as noncompetes—without understanding how they affect
that balance will disrupt that balance and interfere with efforts to
improve it.
B. Noncompetes Fail as an IP Tool
Employment law scholars have explicated a host of concerns
about noncompetes in the context of the employment relationship.149
Viewed as an effort to protect IP, noncompetes look even more
problematic. Reviewing the variety of mechanisms that may be used
to protect intangible firm assets, it becomes clear that using
noncompetes is part of a “belt-and-suspenders” approach to IP
protection. This approach relies on the assumption that more protection is always better, but this assumption is faulty. As many
observers have described, upstream rights may inhibit downstream
innovation.150 In addition, as summarized above, private gain is not
one of the primary purposes of providing IP protection. Instead,
providing a sufficient, but not excessive, incentive to invent and
create is the goal.151 Given this, the contours of trade secret and
other IP protections make some sense, but the IP justification for
noncompetes begins to make no sense.
The IP justification for noncompetes is not necessarily wrong,152
but it is certainly misplaced. Noncompetes are simply not a good

149. See supra Part I.
150. See, e.g., Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3255 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring)
(stating that “[i]nnovation in business methods is often a sequential and complementary
process in which imitation may be a ‘spur to innovation’ and patents may ‘become an
impediment.’” (quoting James Bessen & Eric Maskin, Sequential Innovation, Patents, and
Imitation, 40 RAND J. ECON. 611, 613 (2009))); Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can
Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCI. 698 (1998);
Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM.
L. REV. 839, 916 (1990) (“[E]very potential inventor is also a potential infringer. Thus a
‘strengthening’ of property rights will not always increase incentives to invent; it may do so
for some pioneers, but it will also greatly increase an improver’s chances of becoming
enmeshed in litigation.”); Heather Hamme Ramirez, Comment, Defending the Privatization
of Research Tools: An Examination of the “Tragedy of the Anticommons” in Biotechnology
Research and Development, 53 EMORY L.J. 359, 368 (2004).
151. See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
152. That is, there may be a need for IP protection, but noncompetes simply are not a good
method of IP protection, particularly because the other effects of the agreements, on individual employees and the labor market, are so problematic. See supra Part I.
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tool for protecting IP rights. First, to the extent that noncompetes
are used as a supplement or an alternative to IP protection, we
ought to be concerned that they may upset the balance struck by the
IP regimes between protection and disclosure; that is, between
private rights and the public availability of inventions, information,
and creations. Second, even if there is a need for additional
protection, consistent with IP policy, noncompetes are not the
solution to that problem as they fail to address the public goods
problem that IP rights are generally meant to solve and, as tools for
protecting IP, they are underbroad.153
First, assuming that the existing IP regimes are perfectly
calibrated, the use of noncompetes is likely to interfere with that
system. In other words, IP law is in some ways intentionally limited.
Indeed, if anything that was not protected by patent law or copyright law could be protected by some mechanism exogenous to the
IP regimes, the balance struck by the federal IP statutes between
protection and availability and between secrecy and disclosure
would be destroyed.154 There would be no reason for inventors or
creators to go through the costly and expensive process of obtaining
a patent. The Supreme Court’s preemption jurisprudence in the IP
area, conflicting and unsatisfactory though it is, recognizes as
much.155
153. See O’Malley, supra note 2, at 1231-32.
154. Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 559 (1973) (“[A] conflict would develop if a State
attempted to protect that which Congress intended to be free from restraint or to free that
which Congress had protected.”).
155. The Court has not been entirely consistent in this regard, but overall the preemption
cases make clear that the IP regimes cannot be viewed in isolation. Although in Kewanee the
Court stated that “the patent policy of encouraging invention is not disturbed by the existence
of another form of incentive,” Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 484 (1974), the
opinion also points to the limitations of trade secret law in reasoning that there is no conflict,
id. at 489-90. And in other cases, the Court has struck down state laws as interfering with the
incentive function provided by federal patent law. See, e.g., Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder
Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 141 (1989) (preempting a Florida statute that prohibited
copying of unpatented boat hulls); Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 237
(1964) (holding that for a state to “forbid copying would interfere with the federal policy, found
in Art. I, § 8, cl. 8, of the Constitution and in the implementing federal statutes, of allowing
free access to copy whatever the federal patent and copyright laws leave in the public
domain”); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 232-33 (1964) (“But because of the
federal patent laws a State may not, when the article is unpatented and uncopyrighted,
prohibit the copying of the article itself or award damages for such copying. The judgment
below did both and in so doing gave Stiffel the equivalent of a patent monopoly on its
unpatented lamp.”) (citation omitted).

2010]

THE WRONG TOOL FOR THE JOB

913

Trade secret law plays a role in this balancing act. The contours
of trade secret law perform a channeling function, directing some
kinds of inventions to the patent system and others to the purview
of state trade secret law—or to no protection at all. If noncompetes
were permitted to fill this state-law hole, even partially, the
channeling function performed by trade secret law would be
undermined.156 A refusal to enforce noncompetes would recognize
that some of the limitations of trade secret law ought not to be
remedied. It would, in other words, perform a channeling function
of its own. The argument that noncompetes are necessary as an
alternative or supplement to trade secret rights, then, collapses if
the “weakness” in trade secret law is intentional, operating to direct
certain inventions to the patent realm or dictating that the item not
be protectable.
Even to the extent that trade secret law is unintentionally or
improperly weak, the IP justification for noncompetes is unpersuasive. If trade secret protection is insufficient on its own terms and
within the larger scheme for protecting IP (that is, if it fails to
achieve what it seeks to achieve) the solution to that problem lies
more properly with the areas of law directed at protecting
intangibles—patent or copyright law, nondisclosure agreements,
duties of loyalty and confidentiality, and doctrines governing the
ownership of human capital—than with noncompetition agreements. With this understanding, a refusal to countenance noncompetes would serve a different kind of channeling function, encouraging development of trade secret law, whereas the continued use of
noncompetes discourages changes in the legal regime that may more
effectively serve the IP justification.
The IP justification fails even when other forms of IP protection
are insufficient because noncompetes are simply not a good tool for
achieving the purposes of IP protection. Even assuming that there
is a need for a greater incentive to produce, invest in, and disclose
intangibles, noncompetes are unlikely to provide that incentive.
First, they operate bluntly and only indirectly to provide that
incentive and to protect IP assets. Second, the empirical work
performed so far on the effects of noncompetes on innovation
indicates that the agreements simply do not provide much, if any,

156. See supra Part II.A.2.
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incentive;157 accordingly, they cannot be justified on a utilitarian
basis. Indeed, studies indicate that firms may in fact be better off
overall under a regime in which noncompetes are unenforceable.158
As a method for protecting IP, noncompetes work only indirectly.
They are essentially a “backdoor” method of trade secret protection
because contract law is not generally a good tool for addressing the
concerns implicated by the IP justification.159 IP rights operate
against the world, whereas contract rights do not. Noncompetes in
particular do not address the public goods problem very well
because they do not seek to control the thing society seeks to
incentivize. Rather, noncompetes use control over people as a proxy
for controlling things. A noncompete restricts not the use of a good
or an invention but the labor of the creator. Put simply, noncompetes regulate the inputs to creation and invention, whereas IP
rights regulate the inventive or creative outputs.160 Because
noncompetes regulate employees rather than their inventive or
creative results, noncompetes are a blunt instrument for the IP
task.
In addition, as described in detail above, there are a variety of
collateral problems involved in enforcing noncompetes: restrictions
on employee mobility, broader effects on the labor market, and so
on.161 Oddly, then, noncompetes are both too broad, given their
problematic aspects, and at the same time perhaps too narrow
—because they do not operate as rights against the world—if in fact
there is an insufficient incentive for the kinds of intangibles
employers seek to protect with noncompetes.
This argument about the misfit between the IP justification and
noncompetes is buttressed by recent empirical work. The stud157. See infra notes 167-90 and accompanying text.
158. See infra note 166.
159. Contract law may be very effective for the efficient transfer of IP rights.
160. I borrow the terminology from Matt Marx. He discusses it as follows: In the case of IP
rights,
[t]he deadweight loss is often rationalized ex ante in that the good never would
have been invented in the first place if not for promise of a non-zero monopoly
price. In the case of non-compete agreements, however, the deadweight loss
bears a less direct relationship to the incentive to invest because ... noncompetes restrict access to the inputs of the innovative process instead of the
outputs.
Marx, Good Work, supra note 73, at 48 (emphasis added).
161. See supra Part I.
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ies—limited though they are—indicate that noncompetes simply
may not provide much of an incentive to innovate, and perhaps do
not contribute to overall economic development.162
The IP justification is based on the assumption that a firm is
likely to be harmed, presumably in terms of its growth, profitability,
or productivity, if it cannot impose noncompetes on its employees.163
This is another version of the incentive argument: that there will
not be sufficient investment in the absence of this form of protection. There is, however, some evidence that these assumptions do
not hold up, and that, in fact, the free mobility of labor contributes
to economic development of firms and to increased innovation
because of the knowledge spillovers created by employees moving
from one employer to another.164 Some studies do indicate that there
are costs to firms associated with these knowledge spillovers (that
is, that employers lose something when employees leave for a
competing firm), but that those costs are outweighed by the benefits
conferred by the spillovers received from other firms and the
increased productivity of employees.165 Therefore, it may be that a
firm’s incentives to invest in employees, to disclose information to
employees, and to innovate are not sharply reduced by a legal
regime in which noncompetes are unenforceable.166 This evidence
undermines—if it does not completely destroy—the IP justification
for the enforceability of noncompetition agreements.
In a well-known study comparing Silicon Valley in California with
Route 128 in Massachusetts, two prominent high tech areas,
AnnaLee Saxenian described the divergent performances of the two
regions. In 1965, Route 128 firms employed roughly three times as
many people in the technology sector as Silicon Valley did, but by
1990, Silicon Valley companies had many more people employed in

162. Stone, Knowledge at Work, supra note 92, at 758; see also Bar-Gill & Parchomovsky,
supra note 64, at 1656.
163. Stone, Knowledge at Work, supra note 92, at 746.
164. See infra notes 167-90 and accompanying text.
165. See generally Norman D. Bishara, Covenants Not To Compete in a Knowledge
Economy: Balancing Innovation from Employee Mobility Against Legal Protection for Human
Capital Investment, 27 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 287, 308, 310 (2006); Brett M. Frischmann
& Mark A. Lemley, Spillovers, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 257, 258 (2007).
166. See O’Malley, supra note 2, at 1230 (“The positive economic impact of employee
mobility may suffice to override any policy concerns regarding the protection of an employer’s
interest in retaining its employees.”).
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that sector than Route 128 did.167 Saxenian concluded that Silicon
Valley’s “culture of mobility” explained a great deal of the differential performance between the two industrial districts.168 According
to Saxenian, the transfer of knowledge by employees moving from
one firm to another was conducive to technological innovation and
economic growth.169 In her view, Silicon Valley’s “efficiency advantage, and the resulting performance gap” with Route 128 was
attributable to differences between the business cultures in the two
regions.170 Notably, employees in California were significantly more
mobile, changing jobs much more frequently than employees in the
Route 128 area.171 Some have called this “high velocity” employment.172
In a 1999 article building on Saxenian’s work, Ronald Gilson
attributed Silicon Valley’s high rates of employee mobility and
Route 128’s relatively lower rate to, most significantly, the difference in the two states’ approaches to noncompetes.173 Gilson
167. ANNALEE SAXENIAN, REGIONAL ADVANTAGE: CULTURE AND COMPETITION IN SILICON
VALLEY AND ROUTE 128, at 3 (1994); see Ronald J. Gilson, The Legal Infrastructure of High
Technology Industrial Districts: Silicon Valley, Route 128, and Covenants Not To Compete, 74
N.Y.U. L. REV. 575, 587 (1999) (“In 1995, Silicon Valley reported the highest gains in export
sales of any metropolitan area in the United States, an increase of thirty-five percent over
1994; the Boston area, which includes Route 128, was not in the top five.”).
168. SAXENIAN, supra note 167, at 111-15. Other research supports Saxenian’s conclusion.
See, e.g., Richard Gordon, Innovation, Industrial Networks, and High-Technology Regions, in
INNOVATION NETWORKS: SPATIAL PERSPECTIVE 185-91 (R. Camagni ed., 1991) (arguing that
employee mobility leads to increased innovation and economic growth because of the transfer
of information among firms); see also Richard C. Levin, Appropriability, R&D Spending, and
Technological Performance, 78 AM. ECON. REV. 424, 427 (1988) (suggesting that information
spillovers between firms do not negatively affect spending for research and development).
There is no consensus on this issue, of course. Some have asserted that there may be too much
employee mobility, arguing that employee mobility is beneficial to individuals but imposes
costs on the economy as a whole. See RICHARD L. FLORIDA & MARTIN KENNEDY, THE
BREAKTHROUGH ILLUSION: CORPORATE AMERICA’S FAILURE TO MOVE FROM INNOVATION TO
MASS PRODUCTION 91 (1990).
169. SAXENIAN, supra note 167, at 34-37.
170. Gilson, supra note 167, at 578 (describing Saxenian’s view).
171. SAXENIAN, supra note 167, at 34 (stating that in Silicon Valley, “engineers shifted
between firms so frequently that mobility not only was socially acceptable, it became the
norm”).
172. See Gilson, supra note 167, at 591 (defining “high velocity labor markets” as those
with “rapid employee movement both between employers and in connection with founding
start-ups”).
173. Id. at 578. Gilson described this as an “alternative explanation,” though it seems to
me entirely consistent with Saxenian’s account. In fact, Saxenian herself pointed to the
differing rules concerning noncompetes as one of the factors influencing employee mobility
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described the different legal rules—noncompetes unenforceable in
California, but enforceable generally in Massachusetts—as providing for a “natural experiment,”174 the results of which he presented
as quite clear: “Because California does not enforce post-employment covenants not to compete, high technology firms in Silicon
Valley gain from knowledge spillovers between firms. These
knowledge spillovers have allowed Silicon Valley firms to thrive
while Route 128 firms have deteriorated.”175 Gilson concluded that
the legal rule in California invalidating noncompetes was one of the
operative mechanisms in increasing economic development and
innovation in California.176 There was increased employee mobility
in the absence of enforceable noncompetes so that knowledge
“spill[ed] over” to competing firms, leading to increased economic
returns and innovation.177
The California rule concerning noncompetes was crucial in this
story because it solved a collective action problem.178 According to
Gilson, “[w]hile it would be in the interest of the region’s firms
collectively to facilitate employee mobility even at the expense of
diluting the intellectual property of individual firms, it will be in the
interest of any individual firm to impede the mobility of its own
employees.”179 In other words, when noncompetes are enforceable,
firms will use them in an individually rational but collectively
irrational way. Gilson concluded that the California rule against the
enforcement of noncompetes served a coordinating function,
“solv[ing] the collective action problem associated with encouraging
knowledge spillover through employee mobility.”180 According to
Gilson, there was a causal connection in this case between the legal
rule (noncompetes unenforceable) and the high velocity employment
and the resultant knowledge spillovers. SAXENIAN, supra note 167, at 35.
174. Gilson, supra note 167, at 578.
175. Id. at 575; see also Pivateau, supra note 42, at 692 (claiming that because of noncompetes, “employers may be deprived of access to well-trained employees, even those subject to
otherwise unenforceable agreements”).
176. Gilson, supra note 167, at 578.
177. Id. at 579 (“Knowledge, especially tacit knowledge, ‘spills over’ between firms through
the movement of employees between employers and to start-ups.”).
178. The rational actor argument would be that if knowledge spillovers brought about by
employee mobility are value enhancing, “[i]ndividual firms acting in their own self-interest
will elect not to interfere with employee mobility.” Id. at 595. This standard account does not,
however, take account of the collective action problem.
179. Id. at 596.
180. Id. at 579-80.
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in Silicon Valley, and it was high velocity employment that led to
better outcomes for the region as a whole.181
More recent studies on noncompetes have confirmed Gilson’s view
that firms did not necessarily act irrationally, on an individual
basis, in imposing noncompetes.182 There are some demonstrated
benefits for firms in binding their employees to noncompetes. They
are more likely to pay lower wages (which is related to the bargaining and consideration point made in Part I.B.1), retain employees
(which is related to the employee mobility point discussed in Part
I.B.2),183 and experience reduced competition from others in the
market.184 Notably, each of these is the flip side of the arguments
against the enforceability of noncompetes, such as the flaws in the
bargaining process and the effects on the labor market. The benefits
to individual firms thus appear to come at the cost of some other
interests: employee mobility, commercial exchange, and a competitive marketplace.
As Gilson and others pointed out, this individual rationality may
be collectively counterproductive.185 The evidence indicates that
industrial sectors as a whole experience more growth and development when a legal regime prohibits noncompete enforcement.186 In
another study based on the Michigan “natural experiment,” Matt
Marx, Jasjit Singh, and Lee Fleming concluded that noncompetes
181. Id. at 596-97 (“[T]he regime of high velocity employment appears to have resulted from
the legal infrastructure’s failure to provide complete protection for an important category of
intellectual property.”).
182. Burk & McDonnell, supra note 125, at 632.
183. See supra notes 62, 73 and accompanying text.
184. Sterk, supra note 33, at 408.
185. Burk & McDonnell, supra note 125, at 632; see also Fosfuri & Rønde, supra note 127,
at 47.
186. See, e.g., Fosfuri & Rønde, supra note 127, at 63 (“A system of trade secret protection
based on covenants not to compete or the possibility to seek an injunctive relief behave quite
differently from one based on punitive damages. Indeed, stronger protection does not affect
clustering. Instead, it prevents technology spillovers from arising when firms locate in the
same region. In this sense, our model provides some support to Gilson’s ... claim that the lack
of enforceable covenants not to compete has spurred labor mobility and innovation in Silicon
Valley.”); On Amir & Orly Lobel, Innovation Motivation: Behavioral Effects of PostEmployment Restrictions 36 (Univ. of Cal. San Diego Legal Studies Paper No. 10-32, 2010),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1639367 (discussing the
collective action problem and concluding that legal rules such as California’s prohibition on
noncompetes “can be viewed as addressing this collective action problem” described as “a
prisoner’s dilemma where everyone is better off with the optimal free flow of information but
single players instead maintain secrecy and create high walls”).
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play a role not just “within a region but across regions as well—with
harmful implications where the use of such contracts is sanctioned.”187 They described their findings in rather stark terms:
[N]oncompetes contribute to a “brain drain” of the most valuable
knowledge workers from regions that enforce them to those that
do not, driving away those with higher levels of human and
social capital while retaining those who are less productive or
connected. Over time, this process contributes to the accumulation of elite inventors in regions that prohibit enforcement.188

Another recent study bolsters the conclusion that noncompetes
may be counterproductive for firms. Although many firms contend
that noncompetes are necessary to protect their investment in
employees, it may be that in some circumstances the presence of
noncompetes actually reduces the employee’s incentive to “invest in
their work performance.”189 The empirical work thus demonstrates
that, in a variety of ways, noncompetes impose substantial costs and
provide little benefit.190 In such a situation, legal regulation makes
sense.
The notion that less protection—in this case, the unenforceability
of noncompetes—increases both economic growth and innovation
contradicts the standard law and economics argument about IP
assets. The argument proceeds as follows: “In the absence of complete protection, producers will not capture all of the gains resulting
187. Matt Marx, Jasjit Singh & Lee Fleming, Regional Disadvantage? Noncompete
Agreements and Brain Drain 2 (July 21, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://portale.unibocconi.it/wps/allegatiCTP/MarxSinghFleming2009.pdf.
188. Id.
189. Amir & Lobel, supra note 186, at 35. In an experimental study, On Amir and Orly
Lobel found that “certain conditions of post-employment contractual restrictions may
negatively impact motivation.” Id. In those cases, the presence of the noncompete restriction
may reduce the firm’s innovation and economic growth.
190. I have described the strong version of this argument: a legal rule permitting the
enforcement of postemployment restraints hampers the economic development of firms and
the regions in which those firms operate. The studies done to date have focused on just a few
jurisdictions and on certain sectors of the economy. Virtually all of the studies have focused
on higher-wage employees and on the technology sector. Even taking these limitations into
account, however, it remains significant that no studies have concluded that noncompetes are
procompetitive or substantially assist firms in protecting their assets.
But if one is unwilling to accept the strong version of the argument, even the weak version
undermines the IP justification. The weak version is that the rule against enforcement of
noncompetes does not hurt firms, at least not significantly, and is not, on balance, inefficient.
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from their efforts, and too little intellectual property will be produced.”191 Similar arguments are made with respect to investments
in “human capital.” There is concern, for example, that “without
some assurance that employees will perform long-term employment
contracts, employers might well underinvest in development of firmspecific human capital.”192 The evidence on noncompetes indicates
that more rights—contract rights, in this case—do not necessarily
lead to greater economic returns.193 I certainly do not intend to enter
into that broader debate here, but there is sufficient evidence in the
context of noncompetes that cognitive and behavioral factors on the
part of both employees and employers may well lead to the imposition of noncompetes that are not just unfair to employees but are
useless, or perhaps even counterproductive, for employers.
I have argued that noncompetes are used primarily as a tool for
protecting IP or IP-like assets. Understood as an IP tool, noncompetes are a failure. Some of the perceived flaws in trade secret law
are not mistakes; they are instead part of the larger regime for
protecting, or not protecting, IP. To the extent this is the case, the
“weakness” of trade secret law simply does not justify the imposition
of noncompetes. To the extent that trade secret and other IP rules
provide unintentionally insufficient protection, noncompetes are not
the solution. They are the wrong tool for the IP job because they do
not address the public goods problem effectively and are unlikely to
provide the incentive for invention that animates the IP justification.194
191. Gilson, supra note 167, at 620-21 (citing MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK, THE COMMON LAW
RESTRAINT OF TRADE: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 152-53 (1986)); see also Kitch,
supra note 22, at 710 (discussing the standard law and economics approach but also
recognizing Silicon Valley’s success in the absence of noncompetition agreements, citing it as
“[a]nother bit of evidence that the real world does not operate as logic suggests”).
192. Sterk, supra note 33, at 393.
193. Gilson, supra note 167, at 621 (“[T]he comparison is between the average per firm cost
of diluted intellectual property protection and the average per firm benefit associated with the
preservation of the high technology industrial district.”). This is, obviously, an empirical
matter, and one I cannot address here, but, as Gilson suggests, “the difference in performance
of Silicon Valley and Route 128 is a little more than casual.” Id.
194. See O’Malley, supra note 2, at 1231-32 (“Limiting the enforcement of covenants not
to compete would simply force employers to rely more heavily on statutory protection of trade
secrets rather than on contractual solutions. Although the standard of proof in a trade secret
dispute is often difficult and expensive to meet, this statutory scheme ensures that only the
most legitimate business interests take priority over the important public policy concerns
regarding employee mobility.”). On the differing approaches to legal regulation of human
OF
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CONCLUSION
Change is afoot in noncompete law. In the past few years, the
California Supreme Court emphatically affirmed that state’s refusal
to enforce the agreements, a number of states are in the process of
reforming the doctrine, and the ALI is in the end stages of drafting
a Restatement (Third) of Employment Law that addresses the
enforceability of noncompetes. Given these various developments,
a reexamination of the use and operation of the agreements is called
for.
The existing critiques have focused on only part of the story.
Although employment law scholars have persuasively argued that
noncompetes are a deeply problematic aspect of the employment
bargain and have thus undermined the freedom of contract
rationale for enforcement of noncompetes, insufficient attention has
been paid to the other primary justification for noncompetes—the
IP justification. Understanding that noncompetes are used as IP
tools and that they are particularly bad tools for that job knocks out
the very foundation of noncompete enforcement.
The conclusion drawn from the bargaining process and mobility
concerns is that only some noncompetes should be enforced. This is
true at least in part because courts are unlikely to hold noncompetes
unenforceable. Contract doctrine does not often allow for classes of
contracts to be held unenforceable. Asking courts to inquire, either
on a case-by-case or broader basis, as to the efficiency or efficacy of
particular transactions leads down a slippery slope undermining the
predictability and consistency provided by current doctrine. In other
words, arguments concerning the bargaining process and employee
mobility problems will likely lead to reform of the doctrine, but not
to elimination of noncompete enforcement.
Although it is not surprising that noncompetes provide no benefit
to employees, it is counterintuitive that they also provide little to no
benefit to firms, to the labor market, to regional or national economic development, or to innovation. Yet this is precisely the
direction that the empirical work points. That work buttresses the
argument that noncompetes, which are used primarily to protect IP
or IP-like assets, are the wrong tool for that job. Once noncompetes
capital, see generally Rubin & Shedd, supra note 113.
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are understood this way, it becomes clear that incremental doctrinal
reform is simply insufficient. In this new light, the concerns are
focused not only on employees, the employment relationship, and
the labor market, which are significant factors in themselves, but
also on the IP regimes and the incentives necessary to promote
innovation and encourage economic development.
The conclusion drawn from the IP concerns is that noncompetes
should simply be unenforceable, and it is legislatures rather than
courts that ought to make that change. Rather than asking courts
to consider noncompetes on a case-by-case basis, the appropriate
response to the concerns about noncompetes is a legislative solution.
The evidence concerning the effects of noncompetes on employees
and the arguments about the role of noncompetes in the overall
scheme for protecting IP are policy arguments that should be
directed to policymakers and, indeed, ought to be quite compelling
to policymakers.195 In other words, a legislative approach provides
a substantially better solution than an incremental common law
decision-making approach.
Simply suggesting that firms avoid the use of noncompetes will
not be effective. As Gilson indicated, the possibility of noncompete
enforcement creates a collective action problem: it is individually
rational but collectively irrational for firms to impose noncompetes
on their employees.196 Gilson argued that the California rule
prohibiting noncompete enforcement solved this collective action
problem by operating as a binding mechanism.197 In other words,
this is a situation in which regulation makes sense.

195. See Marx et al., supra note 187, at 6 (“From a regional policymaker’s perspective, the
free flow of talent to the best opportunities is beneficial as long as it occurs locally; workers
who take out-of-state jobs are a loss to the region. Prior work has shown that non-competes
deter intra-regional mobility[;] ... this article establishes that non-competes are responsible
for a brain drain from enforcing states to non-enforcing states. Taken together, these results
suggest that the state sanction of non-competes is a lose-lose proposition at the regional level,
especially in light of recent evidence that R&D investment remains strong and effective in
regions which prohibit enforcement.”) (citations omitted).
196. See supra note 178 and accompanying text.
197. See supra note 180 and accompanying text.

